Constitutional Preemption Of State Laws
Against Massive Oil Spills
Arval A. Morris*
INTRODUCTION

The awesome reality of an impending and severe energy crisis is closing in fast on the United States-so much so, that on
his 91st day in office, President Jimmy Carter unveiled a controversial energy conversion and conservation program, the most
comprehensive energy program any President has ever proposed.
At the heart of America's energy dilemma is oil:' America's growing dependence on oil and the rapid depletion of world oil reserves.! Although the United States was self-sufficient in oil in
1950, by 1970 it had become a net oil importer. By 1976, the
United States imported about 7.3 million barrels of oil each day
(bpd) or 42 percent of its daily consumption requirements of 17.4
million bpd. Alaskan oil became available late in 1977, and, ultimately, it is expected to add 2 million bpd to the domestic supply. This amount, however, merely will replace the decline in
domestic oil production of the lower 48 states between 1970 and
1977. During the winter months of 1977, for the first time in
American history, oil imports reached 50 percent of oil consumption.
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.A., 1951, The Colorado College;
M.A., 1952, J.D., 1955, University of Colorado; LL.M., 1958, Yale University; LL.D., 1972,
The Colorado College. The author thanks Ms. Ann Carey for her aid in preparing parts of
the initial manuscript.
1. The disparity between supply and demand is expected to produce a severe oil
squeeze on the United States by 1985. The major variable in oil exports from members of
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is Saudi Arabian production.
By 1985, Saudi oil production could range from a low of 6.3 million barrels per day (which
amount is sufficient to permit exportation equal to the 1973 embargo level) to a maximum
of 15 million barrels per day if capacity is substantially increased. The industrialized
nations, including the United States, would be in a "safe" position only if they adopted
strong policies of conservation and accelerated development of new fuel sources such as
solar energy.
It is believed the United States will face two oil "squeezes"-in 1978-79 before the
full impact of Alaskan oil is felt and again in the mid-1980's, when domestic demand
surpasses Alaskan production. Rustow, US.-Saudi Relations and the Oil Crisis of the
1980's, 55 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 494 (1977); Smart, Oil, The Super-powers and The Middle
East, 53 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 17 (Jan. 1977).
2. The facts in the remainder of this paragraph are taken from BUREAU OF PUsLC
AFFAIRS,

U.S.

DEI'T OF STATE,

Gier (Oil and Energy), May, 1977.
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These importation figures show oil is more than an increasingly scarce, but vital, fuel. They show oil also to be an important
instrument in world power politics, 3 a target for world strategies,
and a possible source of national and global economic crisis. Furthermore, for purposes of this article, oil is also a threatening
pollutant that can severely impair the quality of life in countless
ways by altering natural balances and by destroying or contaminating usable waters, water life, and shorelines whenever it
spills.' Oil spills, the Supreme Court has declared, are "an insidious form of pollution of vast concern to every coastal city or port
and to all the estuaries on which life of the ocean and the lives of
the coastal people are greatly dependent." 5
In light of this declaration, the purposes of this article are to
assess the validity of the federal court's decision' preempting
Washington's Tanker Pollution Law,7 and to comment generally
on whether, consistent with the evolved preemption doctrine,
coastal states can protect themselves from deleterious oil spills by
enacting preventive rather than deterrent measures.
THE PROBLEM

The Puget Sound estuary" in the State of Washington is the
most productive inland waterway in the continental United
States, having more than 2,000 species of life located on or in its
waters The federal government operates thirteen wildlife preserves on its shores comprising some 2,300 acres, and the State
of Washington operates numerous fish hatcheries and two oyster
preserves which comprise 12,000 acres. More than 60 percent of
the people of the State of Washington reside within twelve counties bordering on Puget Sound. Since 1956, more than 300 million
dollars have been spent by private persons and by local, state,
3. See, e.g., Tucker, Oil and American Power-Three Years Later, 63 COMMENTARY
29 (1977).
4. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NOAA SPECIAL REPORT, THE ARGO MERCHANT OIL
SPILL-A PRELIMINARY SCIENTIFIC REPORT,

March, 1977.

5. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 328-29 (1973).
6. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Evans, No. C75-648M (W.D. Wash. Sept. 24, 1976)
[hereinafter Arco], prob. juris. noted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3582 (1977), sub. nom. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
7. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 88.16.170-.190 (1976).
8.The limits of Puget Sound are defined in WASH. REV. CODE § 88.16.050 (1962).
9. The facts'in this paragraph are drawn from Hearing on Effectiveness of the Ports
and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 119 (1976) (Statement of Robert Lynette); and Pretrial Order at 42, Atlantic

Richfield Co. v. Evans, No. C75-648M (W.D. Wash.).
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and federal governments to preserve and enhance its water quality.
Washington and its citizens have a substantial economic
interest in the natural resources of Puget Sound. The value of
the beds, tidelands and waterfront lands adjacent to Puget
Sound are estimated to exceed $2,000,000,000. . . . The state
has a substantial proprietary interest in these lands, owning
nearly all of the beds and approximately 43% of the tideland
frontage . . . . The Puget Sound fisheries industry, including
commercial and sport fishing, packing and canning, contributes
$170,000,000 annually to Washington's economy . . . Puget
Sound also supports aquaculture programs, including commercial clam and oyster farming and salmon rearing.' 0
Puget Sound has many bays and inlets; its bottom is marked
by channels; it has strong currents running up and down its many
channels and straits; its shoreline is irregular, and it is subject to
a variety of weather conditions including fog, strong winds, and
heavy rains. Because of these facts, during the Senate's 1971
Commerce Committee hearings on the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act of 1972,11 Puget Sound was identified as an area of
significant danger and one likely to cause groundings of vessels,
including oil tankers. For example, oil tankers supplying the oil
refineries at Cherry Point, Ferndale, and Anacortes do so by passing through the treacherous waters of Rosario Strait which extend
for eighteen miles and are three-fourths to one mile wide at their
narrowest points.
The oil industry in the State of Washington is a multimillion
dollar-a-day business. There are five important refineries in
Washington State: ARCO at Cherry Point, Mobil at Ferndale,
Shell and Texaco at Anacortes, and U.S. Oil and Refining Company at Tacoma. These plants process about 350,000 barrels of
crude oil daily (one barrel equals 42 U.S. gallons).' 2 According to
10. Brief of Appellants at 12, Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., No. 76-930 (U.S. Sup.
Ct.) (footnotes omitted).
11. The Navigable Waters Safety and Environmental Quality Act, Hearings on S.
2074 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 366 passim (1971)
(Marine Transportation System-Valdez to West Coast Ports). S. 2074 subsequently became part of The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972. See [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2768.
12. WASH. STATE DEP'T OF ECOLOGY, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, WASHINGTON STATEWIDE OIL POLLUTION ABATEMENT PROGRAM 4 (1976). In addition to the five major
refineries,
Washington's oil industry includes three asphalt refineries, processing about 5,000 barrels
of crude per day, and the U.S. Oil and Refining Company, also producing asphalt. Four
major bulk oil pipelines daily transfer nearly 500,000 barrels of oil throughout the state.
Eighteen bulk terminals have daily throughput of over 410,000 barrels, and 800 handling
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a January 1973 report, each passing day sees the waters, sea life,
and coastlines of Washington being polluted by oil spills and
uncontrolled waste oil disposal. 13 The primary reason is that the
oil industry is steadily expanding in Washington. "Puget Sound
is rapidly becoming the oil refining center of the Pacific Northwest," and "the days of producing petroleum products in the
Northwest for the Washington market only are rapidly fading into
the past."' 4 Completion of the Aleyeska Pipeline will mean additional refineries, further increases in production, and unless
strong corrective measures are taken, an increase in the number
and volume of oil spills." Furthermore, without reflecting any of
the impact Puget Sound will soon experience when Alaskan oil
starts to flow:
Department of Ecology records show two oil spills per day occur
in Washington State; each week oil spills occur that require
localized cleanup and four oil spills per year occur that require
extensive cleanup. Department records also show that 933 oil
spills occurred in Washington State during the period extending
from January 1, 1970 through June 30, 1972. The activity that
caused 490 of these 933 oil spills was known while the cause of
the remaining 443 oil spills was unknown. Of the 490 knowncause oil spills 82 percent (404) were caused by poor housekeeping practices, deliberate dumping, equipment failure or human
error . . ..,6
The problems generated by oil spills from oil tankers in distress in Puget Sound waters are expected to intensify dramatically. 7 Prior to the Arab oil embargo of 1973, ninety percent of
the crude oil needs of Washington's four major refineries had been
supplied by pipeline from Canada. But the Arab oil embargo
facilities distribute these products to consumers.
Five tugboat companies operate on Puget Sound. Approximately 10 ships service
waterfront oil terminals weekly. "More than 15 ship-to-shore or shore-to-ship oil transfers
greater than 1,000 barrels occur every day providing a total movement of about 200,000
barrels per day between ship and shore facilities." Id. at 4-5.
13.

WATER RESOURCES CONSULTATION SECTION, TECHNICAL AssIsTANCE DivisION, OFFICE

OF TECHNICAL SERVICES, WASH. STATE DEP'T OF ECOLOGY, REPORT, OIL POLLUTION, PREVENTION AND CONTROL

14 (1973).

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 16-17. The oil pollution control laws of Washington are found in WASH.
CODE §§ 90.48.315-.910 (1976).

REV.

17. Unless otherwise indicated the facts in this paragraph are drawn from Hearings
on Effectiveness of the Portsand Waterways Safety Act of 1972 Before the Senate Comm.

on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1976) (Statement of the Hon. Daniel J. Evans,
Governor, State of Washington).
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induced Canada to adopt a policy of stopping the exportation of
her crude oil by 1980 with the result that Washington's refineries
are now, or soon will be, supplied with more than 350,000 barrels
of oil per day regularly transported through Puget Sound by oil
tankers. Alaskan oil currently intended for Puget Sound refineries, Canada's change in oil export policy, and inland transhipments of Alaskan oil through Puget Sound will cause oil tanker
traffic on Puget Sound to increase radically. 8 And, perhaps more
threateningly, the oil may be transported over Puget Sound waters in supertankers, thereby drastically increasing total supertanker traffic in Puget Sound and the probability of a massive oil
spill with its potentially severe damage. Moreover, the trend in
oil tanker construction, especially during the past fifteen years
since the closure of the Suez canal in 1967, has been toward larger
size and deeper draft vessels. 9 By "January, 1971, more than onefourth of the world tanker fleet consisted of ships of 175,000 deadweight tons (dwt) and over," and today, "shipbuilders and designers are considering 1,000,000 dwt tankers." 0
Puget Sound has never suffered a massive oil spill but the
probability of such an occurrence will increase significantly when
Alaskan oil, carried by supertankers, begins to reach Washing18. Approximately 15% of the Alaskan crude oil is intended for Puget Sound. In 1974,
imports by tanker to Puget Sound averaged 120,000 barrels per day. In 1977. the opening
year of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, 122,000 barrels per day of North Slope oil are scheduled
for delivery to Puget Sound refineries; by 1978, that amount will increase to 213,000
barrels per day; and by 1981, it will reach more than 336,000 barrels per day. These, of
course, are estimates, and may be low. Jurisdictional Statement of Appellants at 6 n.7,
Evans v. Atlantic Richfield Co., No. 76-930 (U.S. Sup. Ct.).
19. The rise of the supertanker was largely precipitated by the closure of the Suez
Canal during the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1967. This closure made supertankers economically feasible for the long haul around Africa's Cape of Good Hope from the Persian Gulf.
The growth of oil-tanker size during the last 25 years has been dramatic as the following
table shows.

Year

Length
(avg.)

Cargo
In Tons
(avg.)

Cargo
In Barrels
(avg.)

Draft
(avg.)

Relative
Shipping
Cost

1950
1960
1970
1975

650
750
1150
1300

30,000
50,000
250,000
500,000

225,000
375,000
1,875,000
3,750,000

35
38
65
95

100%
88%
45%
38%

Anderson, National and International Efforts to Prevent Traumatic Vessel Source Oil
Pollution, 30 U. MIAMI L. REv. 985, 998 n.48 (1976). High profits which can exceed $4
million per voyage, generated by the relatively low shipping costs, are a powerful stimulus
leading persons to ignore sound ecological principles. Id. n.50.
20. OCEANOGRAPHIC COMMISSION OF STATE OF WASHINGTON, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, OFFSHORE PETROLEUM TRANSFE_ SYSTEMS FOR WASHINGTON STATE at 1-29 (1975).
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ton's waters. One massive oil spill in the wrong place during an
incoming tide could destroy much, perhaps most, of Washington's shell and sea food industry and gravely impair the entire
ecosystem of Puget Sound on which fish, oysters, crabs, shrimp,
and other marine life depend.2 1
The state has recognized the gravity of this situation. A 1975
study done by the Oceanographic Commission of Washington
produced the dire warning that the state can expect at least nineteen oil tanker wrecks in Washington waters during the next
twenty-one years. 22 This projected future is obviously bleak and
undesirable. It demands the state's full attention. 23 This study,
however, is laced with "ifs." If, for example, radical changes are
made in oil tankers or in laws governing the ways tankers supply
oil to Washington's refineries, the study indicates the projected
number of oil tanker wrecks on Puget Sound can be significantly
reduced. Thus, the bleak and undesirable future projected by the
21. Regardless of its form, oil is, gallon for gallon, one of the most destructive environmental pollutants when found in large amounts. See R. Shinn, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF MARINE POLLUTION CONTROL 6 (1974); Schacter & Serwer, Marine Pollution Problems and Remedies, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 84, 88-89 (1971). When spilled on the surface of

water it disrupts the food chain with its oil slick, smothering or poisoning the food chain
base of plankton, algae, or intertidal organisms, causing repercussions throughout the
ecosystem. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, OCEAN
DUMPING: A NATIONAL POLICY 12-17 (1970). The surviving organisms that have ingested
oil introduce it as a toxin into the food chain, and as these toxic pollutants are absorbed
at higher levels in the food chain, they become more densely concentrated, until finally,
they reach man. See Waldichuk, Coastal Marine Pollution and Fish, 2 OCEAN
MANAGEMENT 1, 41 (1974). When it settles on the ocean bottom oil coats seaweed causing
it to be more easily torn free by wave action, resulting in beach erosion. Simultaneously,
some oil biodegrades, reducing the sea's oxygen available to living organisms. Moreover,
oil slicks hamper phytoplankton photosynthesis, the food source of much of the world's
protein and one of the sources of oxygen in the air, and cause much more damage. See
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL

QUALITY, CANCER AND POLYCYCLIC AROMATIC HYDROCARBON

Hearings on Interior and InsularAffairs and Public Works on S. 1751 and S.
2232 Before The Special Joint Subcomm. on Deepwater Port Legislation of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 115-17 passim (1974) (from a report
COMPOUNDS,

prepared by the Mass. Institute of Technology); M. Schwartz & E. Rabin, THE POLLUTION
CRISIS: OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 124 (1972); Holcomb, Oil In The Ecosystem, 166 SCIENCE 204
(1969); and SECRETARIES OF THE INTERIOR AND TRANSPORTATION, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
ON POLLUTION OF THE NATION'S WATER BY OIL AND OTHER HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES (1968).

22. OCEANOGRAPHIC COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, OFFSHORE PETROLEUM TRANSFER SYSTEMS FOR WASHINGTON STATE, at 11-19 to 37
(1975).
23. Relevant state legislation currently seeking to protect Puget Sound includes the
Shoreline Management Act of 1971 (WASH. REv. CODE § 90.58 (1976)); the Water Resources Act of 1971 (WASH. RED. CODE § 90.54 (1976)); the State Water Pollution Control
Act (WASH. REv. CODE § 90.48 (1976)); and the Coastal Waters Protection Act of 1971
(WASH. REv. CODE §§ 90.48.370-.410 (1976)).
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report need not occur. The actual future is subject to human
control, and it is the massive oil spill that must be prevented. 4
THE STATE'S RESPONSE

The most useful approach to the problem of significantly
reducing massive oil spillage and pollution caused by oil tankers
in distress is to concentrate on the vessels themselves and on the
prevention of oil spills. But curiously, reliance has been most
widely placed on deterrence. Potential liability after the fact of
oil spillage and pollution can have some deterrent effects so long
as most violators are identified and the sanctions are severe
enough and fully enforced. Deterrence has been subjected to exhaustive analysis,1 to embodiment in many legislative enact. ments,2 6 and to international cooperative efforts.27 Deterrence can
do little to further reduce tanker sources of oil pollution. One
major problem with deterrence is that it operates after the fact.
From an ecological point of view, it is better to prevent massive
oil spills and their attendant pollution than to worry about them
once they occur, as does deterrence, after the natural balances
have been disrupted. Thus, the law's challenge is to identify coning:

24. Senator Warren Magnuson has also recognized the gravity of the situation, say-

Let's take Whidbey Island to the mainland, 15 miles. A spill would start
toward shore and nobody would know which way it was going until it hit down
there. That is why we are so anxious to keep big ships out of Puget Sound ....
Puget Sound is the cleanest inland sea in the United States. And the tides which
come in there are often 15 feet. If one of those ships [oil supertankers] hit Puget
Sound [and spilled oil] when the tide was going in, we would be two years
shoveling out the area.
Hearings on Effectiveness of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 Before The
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1976).
25. See, e.g., Bergman, No Fault Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 5 J. MARITIME
L. & COM. 1 (1973); Goldie, Liability for Oil Pollution Disasters: InternationalLaw and
the Delimitationof Competences in a FederalPolicy, 6 J. MARITIME L. & CoM. 303 (1975);
Comment, Compensationfor Oil Pollution at Sea: An Insurance Approach, 12 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 717 (1975); Note, Liability for Oil Pollution Clean-up and The Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970, 55 CoRNELL L. REv. 973 (1970); and Mendelsohn, Maritime
Liability for Oil Pollution-Domestic and InternationalLaw, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1
(1969).
26. See, e.g., The Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511376 (Supp. III 1973); Florida Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act of 1970, FLA.

§ 376 (1975); The Washington Water Pollution Control Act, WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 90.48.315-.365 (1976); WASH. STATE DEP'T OF ECOLOGY, LAWS AND OIL SPILL EMERGENCY
STAT.

PRocEDuREs (1970).
27. See, e.g., Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 9 INT'L LEG.
MAT. 45 (1970); and Convention on the Establishment of an International
Fund for Oil

Pollution Damage, 11

INT'L LEG. MAT.

284 (1972).
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trols to prevent oil spills as much as possible. 8
Responding to the challenge and the gravity of the situation,
Washington's legislature enacted the Washington Tanker Pollution Law,2 9 a preventive measure, which Governor Evans signed
into law May 29, 1975. In addition to relying on its police powers,
Washington's legislature also relied on its proprietary powers as
owner of the underlying beds and shores of Puget Sound as those
powers are identified in Washington's constitution and confirmed
by congressional enactment of the Submerged Land Act of 1953.0
Washington's constitution provides for state ownership of "the
beds and shores of all navigable waters in the state up to and
including the line of ordinary high tide, in waters where the tide
ebbs and flows, and up to and including the line of ordinary high
water within the banks of all navigable rivers and lakes."31
In its Tanker Pollution Law, Washington's legislature declared "that the transportation of crude oil and refined petroleum
products by tankers on Puget Sound and adjacent waters creates
a great potential hazard to important natural resources of the
State and to jobs and incomes dependent on these resources" and
that its intent was "to decrease the likelihood of oil spills on
Puget Sound and its shorelines by requiring all oil tankers above
a certain size to employ Washington state licensed pilots and, if
lacking certain safety and maneuvering capability requirements,
to be escorted by a tug or tugs while navigating on certain areas
of Puget Sound and adjacent waters." 3 2 Thus, Washington's legislature sought to provide for vessel safety, for protection of the
marine environment, and for Washington's economy by minimizing the risks of oil spills and pollution while simultaneously allowing oil to be transported on Puget Sound. To accomplish these
ends, it required any oil tanker of fifty thousand dwt or greater,
to take and pay a state licensed pilot while navigating Puget
28. Like deterrence, the control of oil pollution after it has occurred through cleanup
techniques or through techniques seeking to minimize on-going spillage is of limited
usefulness, doing little to prevent much of the ecological harm. This is a technical area
left largely to engineers and scientists (see generally Dean, The Chemistry of Crude Oils
in Relation to Their Spillage on the Sea, in Hearings on H.R. 6495 Before House Comm.
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong. 2d Sess., ser. 91, pt. 4, at 285 (1969)),
except for an international agreement giving coastal nations pollution control jurisdiction
over foreign vessels on the high seas in certain limited areas. See The Convention Relating
to Intervention on the High Seas In Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties,9 INT'L LEG. MAT.
25 (1970).
29. WASH. RPv. CODE §§ 88.16.170-.190 (1976).
30. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1970).
31. WASH. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
32. WASH. REV. CODE § 88.16.170 (1976).
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Sound and adjacent waters.

3

Washington's statute further provides that any oil tanker
"greater than one hundred and twenty-five thousand deadweight
tons shall be prohibited from proceeding beyond a point east of a
line extending from Discovery Island light south to New Dungeness light" (this provision defines "Puget Sound" and limits supertankers in the treacherous waters of the straits of Rosario and
Georgia); that oil tankers between 40,000 and 125,000 deadweight
tons may proceed beyond the points enumerated if such tankers
are equipped with certain safety features (relating to shaft horsepower, twin screws, double bottoms, and two radar systems), but
if such tankers are not so equipped they may proceed beyond the
points enumerated only so long as such tankers are under tug
34
escort.

The Washington legislation appears to have been drafted to
accommodate two noncompeting transcendent interests. First,
the statute seeks to realize the state interests in protecting its
property, its economy, its sea life, and its environment from traumatic damages caused by massive oil spills and oil pollution by
preventing or reducing their likelihood of occurrence. Secondly,
the statute does not flatly prohibit all oil tankers on all parts of
Puget Sound, but rather it seeks to realize compelling state interests while simultaneously vindicating state and national interests
in the free flow of commerce under the commerce clause, including tanker transport of oil over the waters of Puget Sound, by
requiring oil tankers to use adequate safeguards.
THE ARCO CASE

The day the Washington Tanker Pollution Law became
effective, the Atlantic Richfield Co. (ARCO) and Seatrain Lines
Inc. filed a complaint in federal court praying, inter alia, that the
law be declared an unconstitutional state intrusion into areas
either exclusively reserved to the national government under its
unexercised foreign affairs powers 5 or its dormant commerce
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 88.16.180 (1976).
34. WASH. REv. CODE § 88.16.190 (1976). The laws of other states also provide
vessel
equipment and operation standards and for nonconforming vessel exclusion
from state
waters. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.STAT. ANN. §§ 35-54; N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 145-a:11;
ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 560(3); and ALASKA STAT. §§ 30.20.010-.070 (Supp. 1976).
35. The Arco court did not discuss this contention, but compare DeCanas
v. Bica,
424 U.S. 351 (1976), with Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). For a discussion
of
international law indicating it precludes neither national nor state regulation,
see Anderson, Nationaland InternationalEfforts to Prevent Traumatic Vessel Source
Oil Pollution,
30 U. MIAMI L. REv. 985 (1976).
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powers, 3 or preempted by Congress in the exercise of its commerce powers. Seatrain was completing construction of two gigantic oil supertankers, each of 225,000 deadweight tons, which
it wanted to use to carry crude oil from Alaska to west coast ports,
but at the time of suit, it had no sale or charter commitment for
either of the vessels.3 1 Seatrain's mere potential loss raises a
standing issue the federal court ignored. Arco had contracted
with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries of Japan to construct three oil
supertankers, two of 151,000 deadweight tons each and one of
120,000, which it wanted to use on Washington waters. Puget
Sound is the only developed port area on the west coast with a
controlling depth sufficient to accommodate fully loaded oil supertankers of a size in excess of 125,000 deadweight tons.
One of the last three-judge courts under the old rules39 was
convened and in September, 1976, ignoring any standing and
abstention 0 questions that might be involved in the Arco case,
the court delivered a cryptic but unanimous opinion," holding
"[wie are persuaded that federal law has preempted the field"
and "[b]ecause the Washington Tanker Law conflicts with Federal law preempting the same subject matter, the state law is
void." Although the Arco plaintiffs had asserted other grounds
for declaring the statute void the court found it unnecessary to
consider these other grounds. 3 In making its preemption ruling
36. The Arco court also did not discuss this contention, but cf. Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (discussed infra), and consider Askew v.
American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973); Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S.
1 (1937); The James Gray v. The John Fraser, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 184 (1858), in the context
of Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851). See also text at notes 19698 infra.
37. Pretrial Order at 19, 21-22, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Evans, No. C75-648M (W.D.
Wash.).
38. For an authoritative discussion of the requirements of standing, see Harrington
v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 205 n.68 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
39. On August 12, 1976, Congress passed Public Law 94-381 repealing 28 U.S.C. §§
2281 and 2282, and amending § 2284, abolishing three-judge district courts in most situations where the constitutionality of a state statute is challenged, except for reapportionment and other limited classes of cases; see 28 U.S.C.A. § 2284 (Supp. 1977).
40. The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the abstention doctrine
provides "Obviously it is for the [state] courts to decide the effect of [state] administrative regulations [and laws] . . .and thus to decide in the first instance whether and to
what extent [state law] as construed would conflict with . . . federal laws or regulations." DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 365 (1976). For a comprehensive discussion of the
abstention doctrine, see Note, Federal Courts, Injunctions, DeclaratoryJudgments, and
State Law: The Supreme Court has finally Fashioned a Workable "Abstention Doctrine,"
25 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 75 (1976).
41. Arco, supra note 6.
42. Id. at 3, 6.
43. Id. at 6.
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the Arco court did not rely on any express congressional intent to
preempt the area because the statute held to be preemptive, the
Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA),4 4 contains
none. Instead, the Arco court inferred Congress's preemptive intent from the mere enactment of PWSA conferring discretionary
regulatory authority, apparently on the belief that the federal
statute, even in its semi-dormant state, was so comprehensive
that Congress inferentially intended to preclude all state activity
in the field.
THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE

Preemption is a term without a precisely clear and agreed
descriptive content, and courts and lawyers use it in different
ways. The result can be confusing. Perhaps part of the responsibility lies with the Supreme Court itself. Clarity requires at least
three separate notions be identified: (1) supersession because of
conflict, (2) supersession because of preclusion (occupation of the
field), and (3) joint regulation. Together, these three concepts can
be viewed as making up the preemption doctrine. But, even so,
no abstract formulation of the preemption doctrine can be relied
upon to resolve all the problems of federalism implicit in preemp45
tion situations.
A finding of preemption vindicates the Constitution's supremacy clause.4" Preemption occurs whenever a court rules a
state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,"47 and
therefore fairly infers that Congress's purpose encompassed elimination of the state law. Preemption cases reaffirm Congress as the
regulator of our federal system. The question in each case is what
was Congress's purpose. 4 A state law stands as an obstacle to
congressional purpose whenever (1) it actually conflicts with a
federal law4 ; or (2) produces "a result inconsistent with the objec44. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-27 (Supp. V 1975); and 46 U.S.C. § 391a (Supp. V 1975).
45. For example, Mr. Justice Butler stated that "Our decisions provide no formula
for discovering implied effect of federal statutes upon state measures." H. P. Welch Co.
v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, 84 (1939). Although the Court uses various expressions,
e.g., conflicting, repugnance, irreconcilability, interference (Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52 (1941)), no test is sufficiently accurate because preemption decisions usually pivot on
the exact wording and policies of the specific statutes in issue.
46. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
47. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See generally Hirsch, Toward a New
View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515; Note, The Preemption Doctrine:
Shifting Perspectiveson Federalismand The Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975).
48. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
49. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963).
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tive of the federal statute"; 0 (3) whenever "the scheme of federal
regulation [is manifestly] so pervasive as to make reasonable the
that Congress left no room for the States to supplement
inference
it"; 5 1 or (4) whenever "the Act of Congress [regulates] a field in
which the federal interest is so [clearly] dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws
on the same subject."5 The latter two areas of preemption are
known as the occupation-of-the-field ground, the former two as
the conflict ground, although the two grounds are not mutually
53
exclusive.
The Conflict-Supersession Ground
The clearest and most defensible application of the conflict
ground of preemption is found where courts strike state statutes
only when they can "not be reconciled or consistently stand together with federal statutes."54 Thus, if a conflict exists between
the actual wording of provisions of state and federal laws such
"that compliance with the one is defiance of the other,"'55 the
appropriate course of judicial action is clear. Under the supremacy clause, federal law supersedes the state statute.
The justification for applying the conflict ground lessens dramatically when no clear conflict exists. As the amount of state
curtailment or interference with a federal law progressively decreases there is less justification for preemption. A remotely possible, or even an actual but slight, interference or inconsistency
with a federal purpose makes the justification for applying the
conflict ground to a state statute more attenuated. Frequently the
conflict is more subtle and far less susceptible to accurate detection. Moreover, even if a conflict exists, it may be so insignificant
and the state interest sufficiently significant that courts will per50. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), citing Hill v. Florida,
325 U.S. 538 (1945).
51. Id. The bracketed term "manifestly" is inserted to express accurately current
preemption principles, as this article establishes infra.
52. Id. The bracketed term "clearly" is inserted to express accurately current
preemption principles, as this article establishes infra.
53. There is no absolute intellectual distinction between the "conflict" and
"occupation-of-the-field" grounds. If Congress "occupies" the field, then, rather clearly,
a state statute designed to operate in the same field may "conflict" with the federal
statute, or with its operation and achievement of its goals, or with the intent of Congress.
Although the Court frequently distinguishes the two grounds, it does not invariably do
so. See, e.g., Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
54. Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227, 243 (1859).
55. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 116 F.2d 227, 232 (5th Cir. 1940). Such a
conflict would exist, for example, where a state statute requires 350 cubic inch engines in
all tractors, and a federal statute prohibits 350 cubic inch engines in all tractors.
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mit the conflict to continue, and not preempt the state law. The
result is that as the subject and scope of state and federal laws
move farther apart, that is, they are tangential at only one point
and otherwise operative in completely different fields, they produce the most difficult cases for justifying an application of the
conflict ground. 6 Obviously, if state and federal laws are not
tangent at any point but operate in completely different areas,
there can be no conflict, and hence, no supersession.
Recognizing states as well as the federal government have
legitimate interests, a finding of conflict is not favored. For this
reason, the Supreme Court is prone to reconcile state and federal
statutes wherever possible and even to permit minor state impairments of federal statutes when founded on important state interests. For example, the conflict ground of preemption was vigorously argued to the Court in Huron Portland Cement Co. v.
Detroit,57 yet the Court held Detroit constitutionally could prosecute a violator of the city's Smoke Abatement Code (1) even
though the polluting vessel's boilers and engine had to be fired
up and cleaned out before it could physically load or unload its
cargo; (2) even though the ship was fully licensed to carry on
interstate coastal trade under federal laws requiring federal
inspection and approval of the vessel's boilers and engine, and (3)
even though there was no way the federally licensed boilers and
engine of this unique vessel could be operated in compliance with
Detroit's Smoke Abatement Code, although the overwhelming
majority of other vessels could. The necessary result was 'that
under the Detroit Code this particular vessel was functionally
prohibited from loading or unloading its cargo at Detroit's ports
and, to that extent, was prohibited from carrying on coastal
trade. Nevertheless, the Court found no constitutionally significant conflict between state and federal law. During the course of
his opinion for the Court, Mr. Justice Stewart commented on
prior opinions in the area. Using language pertinent to Puget
Sound's Arco case, he observed:
The scope of the privilege granted by the federal licensing
scheme has been well delineated. A state may not exclude from
its waters a ship operating under a federal license.

56. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (no conflict
between local pollution law and federal maritime safety statute). But compare Perez v.
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (finding a conflict between federal bankruptcy law and
state limitations on automobile negligence judgment debtors).
57. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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• . . The mere possession of a federal license, however, does not
immunize a ship from the operation of the normal incidents of
local police power, not constituting a direct regulation of commerce. Thus, a federally licensed vessel is not, as such, exempt
from local pilotage laws, or local quarantine laws, or local safety
inspections, or the local regulation of wharves and docks.58
Occupation Of The Field: The Preclusion-SupersessionGround
Occupation of the field results in preemption decisions much
more comprehensive in scope than decisions based on the
conflict-supersession ground. When a federal statute is held to
occupy a field, the supremacy clause precludes all state regulation in that field, even though it may in no way conflict with
operation of the federal statute." The clearest and most defensible application of the occupation-of-the-field ground occurs when
Congress has expressly stated it is occupying the field. 0 This state
of affairs constitutes the paradigm situation of preclusion; that
is, under the supremacy clause congressional will must prevail
and a state is precluded from legislating in a field because Congress expressly has fully occupied it and there is no remaining
room for state legislation; hence, supersession by preclusion.
The justifications for applying the occupation-of-the-field
ground diminish dramatically when there is no clear congressional declaration of intent to preempt an area. When Congress
has not expressed an intent to preempt, courts must rely on inferences drawn from statutes, their histories, and other factors to
preclude state regulation in a given area. Applying the
occupation-of-the-field ground is most difficult when state law
vindicates an obviously important state interest in a field in
which Congress has legislated without expressly declaring its desire to preempt state law. In such situations, some of the criteria
courts use to infer congressional intent are:
The scheme of federal regulation may be so [clearly] pervasive
as to make [manifestly] reasonable the inference that Congress
left no room for the States to supplement it. . . Or the Act
58. Id. at 447 (citations omitted).
59. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), in which the state statute could have
passed muster under the conflict test but did not under the occupation-of-the-field test.
60. For example, because state laws were frustrating Congress's purpose of creating
easily negotiated warehouse receipts, the Federal Warehouse Act was amended in 1931 to
make federal regulation of grain warehouses "exclusive with respect to all persons securing
a license hereunder." 7 U.S.C. § 269 (1970). The conseauence was preemotion of all state
regulations previously applicable. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 223
n.4 (1947). See also Railway Labor Act, § 2 Eleventh, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Eleventh (1970).
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. . .may touch a field in which the federal interest is so

[clearly] dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject. .

.

.[T]he object sought to be obtained by the

federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it
may reveal the same purpose.'
An especially difficult situation is one in which federal law
only partially regulates a field. In these situations, when Congress
has not expressly declared an intent to preempt, courts are really
valuing the desirability of allowing states to burden federal law
in a partially regulated field. Put another way, the problem for
courts under the occupation-of-the-field ground when Congress
has not expressed preemptive intent is one of balancing state
interferences with federal regulation against the evils and harm
to state interests if its attempt to regulate is preempted and some
part of an industry is left unregulated.62 Recognizing the nature
of Supreme Court decisions in this area of preemption, Thomas
Reed Powell characterized its wisdom as depending more "upon
judgment about practical matters and not upon a knowledge of
' '63
the Constitution.
1. The Changing Presumption: Concern for State Interests-The 1930's
The occupation-of-the-field ground raises two questions: (1)
What is the field, and (2) How pervasive and important are the
interests underlying the federal and state regulations? Justice
Stone stated in this regard:
Little aid can be derived from the vague and illusory but often
repeated formula that Congress "by occupying the field" has
excluded from it all state legislation. Every Act of Congress
occupies some field, but we must know the boundaries of that
field before we can say that it has precluded a state from the
exercise of any power reserved to it by the Constitution.4
He thus posed a most difficult problem because the quest for the
intended scope of congressional enactments is most frequently
61. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citations omitted) (the
bracketed terms are added to reflect current preemption principles, as discussed infra).
The Court considered factors neither mutually exclusive nor necessarily concurrent. See
Hirsch, Toward a New View of FederalPreemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515, 531-33.
62. See Powell, Current Conflicts Between the Commerce Clause and State Police
Power, 1922-1927, 12 MINN. L. Rzv. 607 (1928).
63. Powell, Supreme Court Decisions on the Commerce Clause and State Police
Power, 1910-1914 II, 22 COLUM. L. REv. 28, 48 (1922).
64. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 78-79 (1941) (dissenting opinion).
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vague, fruitless, and illusory. 5 Faced with this situation the
Court has fallen back on presumptions. In doing so, the Court has
not always kept these two questions separated, nor will the present article.
Prior to the 1930's the Supreme Court applied a localnational criterion to define the scope of the field, 6 although it
preferred a clear congressional declaration on the subject. This
criterion was quite similar to that which it was applying to define
the scope of state power to regulate commerce under the Cooley
doctrine 7 in situations where Congress had not acted at all. During this era the Court took a rather broad view of the field Congress occupied whenever federal law regulated a subject national
in character. Indeed, in many instances the presumption favoring
federal occupation of the field was so strong that the sole issue
was whether a federal law dealt with a subject state law also
reached. The very exercise of federal power was held necessarily
to preclude state statutes even though their operation was fully
consistent with the federal regulation. 6 On the other hand, if the
subject matter was of local character traditionally regulated by
the states, the Court was willing to take a more restricted view
of the field and the scope of federal preemption.
During the 1930's, the Supreme Court showed greater solicitude for state interests and retreated from its expansive presumption favoring preemption whenever a federal law dealt with a
65. See, e.g., Note, "Occupation of the Field" in Commerce Clause Cases, 1936-1946:
Ten Years of Federalism, 60 HAv. L. REv. 262, 266-67 (1946) [hereinafter Ten Years of
Federalism]. Part of the difficulty in ascertaining the precise boundaries of a "field"
results because boundaries must be inferred from a statute's purpose and much of "federal
law is generally interstitial in nature. It rarely occupies a legal field completely ....
Federal legislation, on the whole, has been conceived and drafted on an ad hoc basis to
accomplish limited objectives ....
" Hart & Wechsler, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 470-71 (2d ed. 1973).
66. See, e.g., Ten Years of Federalism, supra note 65, at 267-68; Note, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 98, 102 (1943); Note, FederalSupremacy and the Davidowitz Case, 29 GEO. L.J. 755,
764-66 (1941).
67. The Court recognized some concurrent state power to regulate commerce "local"
in nature or admitting of "diversity." Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298
(1851). See also California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona,
325 U.S. 761 (1945).
68. See, e.g., Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597,
604 (1915); Engdahl, Preemptive Capabilityof FederalPower, 45 U. COLO. L. REv. 51, 5255 (1973).
69. See, e.g., Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52
(1915). See also Grant, The Scope and Nature of Concurrent Power, 34 COLUM. L. REv.
995 (1934); Comment, Preemption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of
Construction, 12 STA. L. REv. 208, 219-21 (1959).

19771

State Laws Against Oil Spills

subject also reached by state law.70 Abandonment of this presumption placed the responsibility directly on Congress, rather
than the Court, to preempt state laws only by express declaration. Congress, the Court reasoned, was the appropriate governor
of the federal system. The Court developed the clear intent standard to govern judicial decision on whether Congress had occupied a field. If neither an express declaration of congressional
preemptive intent nor an actual conflict was present, the Court
would refuse to rule preemption had occurred unless congressional intent to occupy the field was otherwise definitely and
clearly demonstrated. 7 Moreover, the Court was especially loathe
to infer a congressional intent to occupy a field when public safety
and health were in issue.72 In effect, the clear intent standard
created a new presumption favoring state laws to the extent that,
absent definite and clear congressional intent to the contrary,
state and federal statutes would be deemed capable of standing
together and regulating concurrently.
2. The Changing Presumption: Absolute Federal Supremacy-The 1940's, 50's, and 60's
The Court took a different path beginning with World War
II and continuing through the aftermaths of the cold war, Korea,
and Vietnam. Hines v. Davidowit13 marked the turning point
and invalidated much long standing state legislation. The Court
held the Alien Registration Act of 1940, requiring aliens to register and carry identification cards, occupied the field and
preempted Pennsylvania's law requiring alien registration and
imposing more severe criminal sanctions than federal law. There
was neither an actual conflict between state and federal laws nor
70. For further discussion of the historical changes and development of the preemption doctrine, see Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism
and The Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975); Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of
Federal Power, 45 U. CoLO. L. REv. 51 (1973); Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal
Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L. F. 515; Note, Preemption as a Preferential Ground: A New
Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208 (1959); Ten Years of Federalism, supra note
65.
71. Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933). See also, Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S.
598, 614 (1940) ("clearly indicated"); H. P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79,
85 (1939) ("definitely expressed"). An earlier parallel development occurred with the
"actual conflict" ground of supersession. See, e.g., Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912).
72. Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940).
73. 312 U.S. 52 (1941). Although Hines dealt with registration of aliens and the
federal foreign affairs power, the Court has extended its reasoning to commerce clause
cases and others. See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (copyright clause);
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (commerce clause).
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a definite and clear expression of congressional intent to occupy
the field. Nevertheless, the Court looked to the federal statute's
constitutional foundation, the foreign affairs power, and, impressed by its importance, created a presumption in favor of absolute federal preemption because the federal law belonged "to that
class of laws which concern the exterior relation of this whole
nation with other nations."74 Moreover, it was "so intimately
blended and intertwined with the responsibilities of the national
government"7 5 that the federal statute, on its face, presented a
complete scheme of regulation necessarily precluding all state
laws in the field.7"
In Hines the Court redefined the judicial function in preemption cases holding the question to be decided is whether the state
statute "stands as an obstacle to [achieving] the full purposes
and objectives of Congress." 77 When deciding the question courts
were to consider the "nature of the power exerted by Congress,
the object sought to be obtained, and the character of the obligations imposed by law."" This last requirement obliged courts to
judge how the goals of various federal statutory provisions could
best be achieved; that is, the Court returned to the view that
judges are competent to infer preemptive congressional intent
even in the absence of a definite and clear congressional declaration. This approach harkened back to that of the pre-1930's by
permitting courts again to develop and assert a presumption of
preemptive congressional intent whenever Congress has legislated in a field. This view was confirmed in CloverleafButter Co.
79 where the Court preempted
v. Patterson,
a state statute regulating part of a field untouched by the preempting federal statute,
80
and was further elaborated in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.
Thus, from the 1940's until the rise of the Burger Court, the
Supreme Court was actively involved in regulating the federal
system in preemption cases and expanding absolute federal authority. It greatly relaxed its "definite and clear" requirement of
74. 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 66-67.
77. Id. at 67 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 70.
79. 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
80. 331 U.S. 218 (1947). See also Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971); Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971); Ham v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964); Free
v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Farmer Educ. & Coop. Union of Amer. v. WDAY, 360 U.S.
525 (1959).
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preemptive congressional intent, and it found federal occupation
of the field on the basis of its view of congressional policy embodied in federal statutes,8 or its view of congressional design,"2 or
even its judgment of the chances of a potential conflict between
state and federal laws.83 Decisions of this era essentially marked
a return to the presumption of preemptive congressional intent
and absolute federal supremacy8 4 which lasted until the rise of the
Burger Court.
3. The Changing Presumption: "Normalcy" and A Return to
Strong Concern for State Interests-The 1970's
The Court changed directions in a series of decisions beginning in 1973, and once again showed great judicial solicitude for
joint regulation and a strong concern for state interests.85 In
Goldstein v. California,8" the Court held state law could regulate
the copyright field concurrently with federal law by prohibiting
reproductions of misappropriated phonograph records. Goldstein
heralded the Court's return to its presumption of joint state and
federal power prevalent in the 1930's.
Court reembracement of the doctrine favoring states' presumptive authority was confirmed in New York State Department of Social Services v. Dublino.87 New York work rules,88 im81. In San Diego Building Trade Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), the Court
stated both federal and state courts must defer to the NLRB whenever "an activity is
arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [N.L.R.A.]" in order to "avoid" conflict with national
policy. Mr. Justice Frankfurter was worried lest danger of federal-state conflict would
create a "potential frustration of national purposes." Id. at 244.
82. Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 430 (1963).
83. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
84. For example, in Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962), the Court announced the
absolute supremacy standard: "The relative importance to the State of its own law is not
material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of our Constitution provided that the federal law must prevail." Id. at 666. In Perez v. Campbell, 402
U.S. 637 (1971), the Court applied its presumption of federal preemption and rejected the
"aberrational doctrine . . . that state law may frustrate the operation of federal law as
long as the state legislature in passing its law had some purpose in mind other than one
of frustration" of the federal law. Id. at 651-52. Compare DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351
(1976).
85. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); New York State Dep't of Social
Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). Contra,
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 97 S. Ct. 1305 (1977); Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,
411 U.S. 624 (1973).
86. 412 U.S. 546 (1973). See also, Comment, Goldstein v. California, Breaking Up
Federal Copyright Preemption, 74 COLUM. L. Rav. 960 (1974).
87. 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
88. N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 131(5) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
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plementing the Federal Work Incentive Program (WIN), require
employable persons who receive aid under that part of the Social
Security Act providing Aid To Families With Dependent Children"9 to accept available employment. New York's work rules are
inconsistent with the WIN guidelines because they require earlier
termination of benefits for employable welfare recipients who violate the rules, and use a more summary procedure." The question
in Dublino was whether the more stringent work rules of New
York were precluded because Congress had occupied the field.
The Court ruled the Federal WIN program had not fully occupied
the field." It further held New York had independent and legitimate state interests in promoting self-sufficiency among welfare
recipients and in assuring "that limited state welfare funds be
spent on behalf of those genuinely incapacitated and most in
need."' 2 Moreover, the Court came down squarely against any
presumption favoring federal preemption. 3 Indeed, it set forth a
strictly construed clear intent standard and re-created a strong
presumption in favor of state laws and joint state and federal
regulation:
If Congress is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its
intention clearly. It will not be presumed that a federal statute
was intended to supersede the exercise of the power of the state
unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so. The
exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed. 4
This test of congressional intent is stricter than the clear intent
standard the Court created in the 1930's, and, in effect, it
amounts to a specific intent requirement. The Court is simply
saying if Congress had desired to preempt work rules like New
89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 630-44 (1970).
90. New York's work rules required employable recipients to certify their unavailability for employment, to pick up their checks in person, and to report for job interviews,
public works employment, or any employment that might thereby be generated. Failure
to comply with any of these requirements was deemed a refusal to accept employment,
and termination of benefits ensued. N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 131(5) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
The Federal WIN program's requirements of periodic certification are less strict than New
York's (42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8) (1970)); they contain no termination penalty and contrary
to New York law, the Federal WIN program provides many procedural safeguards. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(4), 602(a)(19)(F), and 633(g) (1970).
91. 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
92. Id. at 413.
93. "Where co-ordinate state and federal efforts exist within a complementary administrative framework, and in the pursuit of common purposes, the case for federal
preemption becomes a less persuasive one." Id. at 421.
94. Id. at 413 (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952), a case at odds
with preemption principles of its period).
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York's with its WIN program, it could explicitly have done so.
"Dublino is therefore a completely state-directed occupation-ofthe-field case, coupling a protective treatment of state interests
and a state presumption with a doctrinal formulation echoing the
pre-Hines-Rice cases." 9 5 Today joint state and federal regulation
of a field is the preferred solution to preemption problems.
The Joint Regulation Ground: No Supersession
Decisions relying on joint regulation result from situations in
which Congress permits both state and federal regulatory laws to
coexist in a field. No supersession of state law occurs, and thus,
no evils affect state interests which might otherwise if federal law
were held to preempt all state law. This is especially important
when federal law does not fully regulate all aspects of potentially
dangerous industries, leaving part unregulated to threaten state
interests.
The current requirement that Congress must clearly manifest its intent to preempt state laws obviously will result in decisions favoring joint regulation. This rule breathes new life into old
cases significant to a proper resolution of the Arco case. In Parker
v. Brown,"e the Court upheld California's scheme for pooling and
eliminating competition among its raisin producers because, although Congress had authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to
establish an identical program, he had only partially done so."' In
H. P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire"'the Court ruled the state's
law regulating maximum hours worked by truck drivers was a
permissible coordinate regulation resting on important state interests, even though the Interstate Commerce Commission had
issued a somewhat conflicting regulation on the subject, but had
postponed the effective date of its order. Once the ICC order
became effective it would, of course, supersede conflicting provi95. Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and The
Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623, 646 (1975). A similar development has taken place
with respect to the conflict ground of supersession. Id. at 646-49; Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). See also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554
(1973), where the Court said even with respect to "necessarily national" matters, permissible situations where conflicts between federal and state laws "may possibly arise" must
be distinguished from other situations where such conflicts "will necessarily arise."
96. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
97. "As we have seen, the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act is applicable to
raisins only on the direction of the Secretary of Agriculture who, instead of establishing a
federal program has, as the statute authorizes, cooperated in promoting the state program
and aided it by substantial federal loans." Id. at 368.
98. 306 U.S. 79 (1939).
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sions of the state law. The Court refused, however, to rule that
Congress had occupied the field and thereby precluded all state
laws whether conflicting or not. These older cases rest on a holding of coordinate purpose of state and federal law, and are fully
consistent with the Burger Court's holding in Dublino, discussed
earlier. Putting these cases together shows that the joint regulation ground of decision is preferred. The current rule appears to
require the actual establishment of a comprehensive plan of federal regulation coupled with a very clearly manifested congressional intent to preempt a field before the Court will apply the
occupation-of-the-field ground and invoke the supremacy clause
to preclude all state law in the same field. Moreover, recent cases,
discussed below, indicate this rule applies irrespective of whether
the state and federal laws share a close harmony of coordinate
purposes or are within identical fields.
Unless strict requirements for preemption are met, the Court
will apply its favored joint regulation ground. Because Congress
has ample power to modify a situation whenever it chooses, the
Court will allow state statutes to stand, emphasizing joint regulation as the practical method of maximizing all underlying governmental interests, state and federal. This is because preemption
necessarily involves the "sensitive interrelationship between statutes adopted by the separate, yet coordinate, federal and state
sovereignties" thereby making the proper judicial approach one
of reconciling "the operation of both statutory schemes with one
another rather than holding one completely ousted." 9
The recent decision in DeCanas v. Bica10 corroborates joint
regulation as the preferred ground of decision under the current
preemption doctrine. California's Labor Code provides "no employer shall knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled to
lawful residence in the United States if such employment would
have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers" and that each
violation is punishable by a fine of up to $500.10' Because the
power to regulate immigration is unquestionably an exclusive
99. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973)
(quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)).
100. 424 U.S. 351 (1976); Note, Presumption in the Field of Immigration: DeCanas
v. Bica, 14 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 282 (1976); Note, Regulation of Illegal Aliens: Sanctions
Against Employers Who Knowingly Hire Undocumented Workers, 4 WEST. ST. L. REV.
41 (1976).
101. Cal. Lab. Code § 2805(a) and (b) (West Supp. 1971).
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federal power'02 and because the Court in Hines v. Davidowitz0 3
had relied on the importance and exclusivity of the power over
foreign affairs and on the pervasiveness of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act (INA) to preempt state laws requiring alien
registration, the question was whether Congress had fully occupied the field when it enacted the INA, also superseding California's law. The Court, unanimously invoking the clear intent standard and treating DeCanas as a joint regulation case, upheld
California's law, stating:
[W]e will not presume that Congress, in enacting.the INA,
intended to oust state authority to regulate the employment
relationship covered by [California's Labor Code] in a manner
consistent with the pertinent federal laws. Only a demonstration that complete ouster of state power-including state power
to promulgate laws not in conflict with federal laws-was 'the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress' would justify that conclusion. Florida& Avocado Growers v. Paul. . . .Respondents

have not made that demonstration. They fail to point out, and
an independent review does not reveal, any specific indication
in either the wording or the legislative history of the INA that
Congress intended to preclude even harmonious state regulation
touching on aliens in general, or the employment of illegal aliens
in particular. 4
The Court distinguished Hines primarily on grounds that,
unlike the California legislature, Congress in the INA had not
specifically regulated the employment relationship of illegal
aliens and there was no indication Congress intended to preempt
state law in the field of employment regulation. 05 The state and
federal laws had different purposes and were not in actual or
necessary conflict. The Court was unable to derive any preemptive intent from the scope and detail of the INA.'"1 Furthermore,
and of significance to the Arco case, the Court found evidence in
a law enacted subsequent to the INA, the 1974 Amendments to
the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, 07 "that Congress
intends that States may, to the extent consistent with federal

law, regulate the employment of illegal aliens.' ' 08 Finally, in the
102. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Chy Lung v.
Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876); Henderson v. New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876); Passenger
Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
103. See note 73 supra.
104. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357-58 (1976) (emphasis added).
105. Id.at 362.
106. Id.at 359.
107. 7 U.S.C. § 2041-55 (Supp. IV 1974). See text discussion infra, at notes 133-35.
108. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 361 (1976).
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course of its unanimous opinion, after quoting approvingly from
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul,'"' the Court gave the
coup de grate to any presumption favoring federal preemption,
ruling "we cannot conclude that preemption is required either
because 'the nature of the subject matter [regulation of employment of illegal aliens] permits no other conclusion' or because
0
'Congress has unmistakably . . . ordained' that result.""
In Florida Lime & Avocado Growers,' relied on in DeCanas,
the challenged California law prohibited state entrance to all
avocados not meeting its minimum-oil content standard of maturity. Federal marketing orders issued pursuant to the Agricultural
Adjustment Act"' judged the maturity of avocados by standards
other than oil content. The Court held federal law had not superseded California's law excluding avocados certified as mature
under federal regulations but containing less than California's
required minimum oil content. The Court concluded "there is
neither such actual conflict between the two schemes of regulation that both cannot stand in the same area, nor evidence of a
'
congressional design to preempt the field."" The Court relied on
4
the finding of no physical impossibility" of complying with both
state and federal law and on the view that "federal regulation by
means of minimum standards of the picking, processing, and
transportation . . . however comprehensive for those purposes
. . . does not of itself import displacement of state control over
the distribution and retail sale of those commodities in the inter'
ests of consumers of the commodities within the State."" These
cases amply evidence the disfavor in which the Court holds
occupation-of-the-field preemption based upon the comprehensiveness of federal statutes.
Unquestionably, the Burger Court has firmly established the
principle of joint regulation, irrespective of common state and
federal purposes in a given field, as the preferred ground of decision in preemption cases. A heavy burden is on the party arguing
in favor of federal supersession to show it was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress to occupy the field. Preemption involves
should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory
109. "[Flederal regulation ...
power in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of the regulated subject
matter permits no other conclusion, or that Congress has unmistakably so ordained." Id.
at 356 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1960)).
110. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976).
111. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
112. 7 U.S.C. § 608c (1970).
113. 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963).
114. Id. at 143.
115. Id. at 145.
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"the sensitive interrelationship between statutes adopted by the
separate, yet coordinate, federal and state sovereignties . . .
[and] the proper approach is to reconcile 'the operation of both
statutory schemes with one another rather than holding one completely ousted."""
PREEMPTION AND THE ARCO CASE

The Arco court rushed to decision without showing any
awareness of recent developments in the preemption doctrine
and, as will be shown, without adequate analysis of the laws
involved. Comprehensive analysis of the preemption issue requires in-depth examination of both the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act of 1972 and Washington's Tanker Pollution Law.
The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA)
"The purpose of the [PWSA] is to promote the safety and
to protect the environmental quality of ports, waterfront areas,
and the navigable waters of the United States.""' 7 Dealing with
the United States' energy crisis was not within the Act's purpose.
The Act contains no express statement concerning preemption.
The legislation contains two titles, each of which follows the same
general scheme of authorizing the secretary of the department in
which the Coast Guard operates to promulgate rules and regulations on certain subjects. This scheme confers discretionary authority, and is founded upon congressional recognition that individual coastal ports and waterways significantly differ; that the
problems they generate are highly local and diverse in character;
and that the Secretary's regulations governing oil tanker and
other vessel traffic for one port are not necessarily proper for all
other ports."18 Thus, Congress recognized that diverseness inheres
in the subject areas. This recognition directly contradicts the
Arco court's view of this area as one requiring national uniformity
and a ruling of preemption.""
116. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973)
(quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1973)).
117. S. REP. No. 92-724, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1972), reprintedin [1972] U. S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2766.
118. 33 U.S.C. § 1222e (Supp. V 1975). See also S. REP. No. 92-724, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 7, 32 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2766, 2791-92.
119. This view is one of long standing. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 299 (1851). Thus, the Supreme Court in Packet Co. v. Catlettsburgh, 105 U.S. 559
(1881), upheld local harbor regulations setting fees and locations for landing vessels stating this type of rule belongs "to that class of rules which, like pilotage and certain others,
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Title 1,120 entitled Ports and Waterways Safety and Environmental Quality, authorizes the Secretary, in his discretion, "to
establish, operate and maintain vessel traffic services and systems for ports, harbors, and other waters subject to congested
vessel traffic, and to require vessels [including oil tankers] which
operate in the area of a vessel traffic system or service to utilize
or comply with it" and to require "such vessels carry or install
electronic or other devices necessary for the use of the service or
system.' 1 2' Thus, Title I is most closely related to provisions of
Washington's law (a) requiring pilots for oil supertankers on
Puget Sound and (b) prohibiting all oil supertankers of more than
125,000 deadweight tons, which pose a threat of massive oil spill,
from proceeding beyond a point east of a line extending from
Discovery Island light south to the New Dungeness light. In a
discussion occupying only two short paragraphs, 22 and without
identifying any express intent of Congress to preempt, the Arco
court held the PWSA preempted all the above-mentioned provisions of Washington's law.
Title 11,123 entitled Vessels Carrying Certain Cargoes in Bulk,
is, as the Arco court recognized, an amendment to and reenactment of the Tank Vessel Act of 1936.4 Title II confers discretionary authority upon "the Secretary to promulgate regulations for
vessel safety and for protection of the marine environment with
respect to design, construction, alteration, repair and maintenance of . . . vessels," including oil tankers. 5 This Title describes by way of illustration a broad category of subjects over
can be most wisely exercised by local authorities, and in regard to which no general rules,
applicable alike to all ports and landing places, can be properly made." Id. at 563.
120. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-27 (Supp. V 1975).
121. S. REP. No. 92-724, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG.

& AD. NEws 2791.

122. Arco and Seatrain contend that the state's restrictions are preempted
by federal regulation in the field, are violative of the commerce clause, and
invade the foreign affairs powers of the United States.
We are persuaded that federal law has preempted the field. Title I of the
Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (the PWSA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221 et seq.,
establishes a comprehensive federal scheme for regulating the operations, traffic
routes, pilotage, and safety design specifications of tankers. Under the PWSA,
the Coast Guard can create traffic-control systems for Puget Sound, and it has
done so. 33 C.F.R. Part 161, Subpart B. The PWSA gives the Coast Guard
authority to restrict and even exclude tankers from Puget Sound under adverse
or hazardous conditions. 33 U.S.C. § 1221 (3) (iv).
Arco, supra note 6, at 2-3.
123. 46 U.S.C. § 391a (Supp. V 1975).
124. Arco, supra note 6, at 3.

125. 1972 U.S.

CODE CONG.

& AD.

NEWS

2786.
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which regulations may be prescribed and its enumeration differs
only slightly from the Vessel Tank Act of 1936, except that authority is expressly granted to prescribe standards for protection
of the marine environment.' Title II is most directly related to
provisions of Washington's law prescribing design and equipment
for oil supertankers between 40,000 and 125,000 deadweight tons
(shaft horsepower, twin screws, double bottoms, and two radar
systems). This size oil supertanker, designed and equipped in
accordance with Washington's law, is permitted to traffic the
entire body of Puget Sound. Oil supertankers between 40,000 and
125,000 deadweight tons not so designed and equipped may also
use the entire body of Puget Sound, but they must be in the
company of a tug escort. In a discussion occupying only three
short paragraphs, 2 and without identifying any express congressional preemptive intent, the Arco court held the PWSA
preempted all the above-mentioned provisions of Washington's
law.
The PWSA Inferentially Authorizes Joint State and Federal
Regulation
The Arco court identified Congress's general approach in this
area when it declared "Congress has invoked 'cooperative federalism'-or at least some state involvement-in virtually all its
126. Id.
127. The purpose of the original Tank Vessel Act, and of Title II of PWSA,
was to establish a uniform set of regulations governing the types of ships permitted within the coastal waters of the United States and the conditions under
which they would be permitted to operate. Balkanization of regulatory authority
over this most interstate, even international, of transportation systems is foreclosed by the national policy embodied in the PWSA.The PWSA has preempted
§ 3(2) of Washington's Tanker Law.
Washington asserts that the minimum design specifications required by §
3(2) of the Tanker Law were not preempted, because they can be avoided if the
tanker has a tugboat escort. Congress has given.the Coast Guard authority to
require tugboat escorts in Puget Sound under hazardous conditions. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1221 (3) (iv). And the Coast Guard has considered doing this. Department of
Transportation, Coast Guard, Final Environmental Impact Statement [on the]
Regulations for Tank Vessels Engaged in the Carriage of Oil in Domestic Trade
71 (August 15, 1975). We believe that the tugboat-escort provision of the Tanker
Law has also been preempted by the federal law.
Arco and Seatrain also argue that § 2 of Washington's Tanker Law (requiring a local pilot on all tankers larger than 50,000 dwt) has been preempted.
Insofar as the Tanker Law prohibits a tanker "enrolled in the coastwise trade"
from navigating Puget Sound unless it has a local pilot, the statute is void; it
conflicts with clear federal law on that subject. 46 U.S.C. §§ 215, 364 (1970).
Arco, supra note 6, at 3-4.
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water-related regulatory programs."'' 8 Inexplicably, the court
then stood the current preemption doctrine on its head, precluding Washington's law by applying the discredited presumption of
absolute federal preemption, presumably by invoking the hoary
reasoning that if Congress had also wanted to permit cooperative
federalism in the PWSA it would have expressly done so. In so
ruling, the court regrettably failed to consider some of the most
relevant provisions of the PWSA, discussed below. These provisions seem to show the opposite; namely, that Congress's approach in the PWSA is consistent with its approach in other
water-related programs and authorizes cooperative federalism,
including Washington's Tanker Pollution Law. For example,
Title I, §102(c), provides: "In the exercise of his authority under
this Title, the Secretary . . . may also consider, utilize, and incorporate regulations or similar directory materials issued by port
' 29
or other State and local authorities.'
Obviously, the Secretary cannot consider, utilize, or incorporate state or local regulations on the items subject to his rule
making powers under the PWSA if mere enactment of the PWSA
has precluded all such regulations. It would appear, therefore,
that the Arco court drew the wrong inference. The appropriate
inference to be drawn from §102(c) is, like Congress's approach
elsewhere in water-related legislation, that the PWSA authorizes
joint state and federal regulation of the entire subject matter
until the Secretary actually establishes conflicting rules either
expressly or necessarily ousting state jurisdiction. Then, and then
only, would a state's rules be superseded, but then only because
of an actual or necessary conflict with federal law and not because
Congress has precluded all state regulation by exclusively occupying the field with the PWSA. Consequently, the Arco court's
ruling in favor of pervasive federal preemption on the sole ground
that Congress occupied the field by enacting the PWSA is erroneous.
Title I, §102(b), illustrating the vast amount of state power
Congress has granted in another area, further corroborates the
correctness of this inference: "Nothing contained in this title prevents a State or political subdivision thereof from prescribing for
structures only higher safety equipment requirements or safety
128. Id. at 4. See, e.g., The Federal Water Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970);
The Air Quality Act of 1961, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970); The Estuarine Areas Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1221-26 (1970); The Deepwater Ports Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24 (Supp. IV 1974).
129. 33 U.S.C. § 1222(c) (Supp. IV 1974).
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standards than those which may be prescribed pursuant to this
title."'3 0
Although inelegantly stated, §102(b) singles out shoreline
structures only, and expressly authorizes states to impose more
stringent safety requirements than the Secretary might prescribe-a kind of reverse preemption. The inferences are (1) the
Secretary's rules in the sole area of shoreline structures are to be
viewed as non-exclusionary of conflicting state regulations (a
kind of reverse preemption); (2) in the other areas regulated by
the PWSA, such as rules applying to vessels, states have joint
authority to create rules not actually conflicting with the Secretary's, but (3) in these other areas states have no power to enforce
state rules conflicting with or more stringent than regulations of
the Secretary as they do in the area of shoreline structures, suggesting that the federal regulations for these other areas are minimum regulations that may be supplemented. This section expressly authorizes states to go beyond federal regulations with
respect to structures only. There is nothing in this section, however, directly or by inference, precluding all state regulation of
vessels when the state regulation is neither more stringent than
the Secretary's rules, nor in actual or necessary conflict with
them.' 3' Thus viewed, the two sections are fully harmonious; one
(§102(c)) authorizes non-conflicting state regulation of vessels
and structures, and the other (§ 102(b)) expressly authorizes more
stringent and conflicting state regulation, but solely for shoreline
structures.
A final statutory provision further corroborates Congress's
intent to permit joint state and federal regulation in the PWSA.
Section 102(e) of Title I provides: "In determining the need for,
and the substance of, any rule or regulation or the exercise of
other authority hereunder the Secretary shall. . . consider-...
(c) existing vessel traffic control systems, services and
schemes."' 3 Again, the Secretary obviously cannot consider
existing traffic control systems of the states or independent port
130. 33 U.S.C. § 1222(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
131. Although stated confusingly, the House Report on H.R. 8140 explained that the
word "only" was added to Title I in order to make it clear that states had power to go
beyond the Secretary's regulations "only" in cases involving the safety of shoreline structures and not with respect to vessels. It was not the intent of Congress by adding "only"
to preempt all state power to regulate vessels generally, thereby contradicting section
102(c), discussed supra. The Secretary's actual regulations directly conflicting with state
regulations of vessels would preempt, but there is no general preemptive intent to preclude
all state regulation of vessels. See H.R. REP. No. 92-563, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1971).
132. 33 U.S.C. § 1222(e) (Supp. IV 1974).
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authorities if such systems cannot exist because they have been
superseded under the preemption doctrine. The appropriate inferences to be drawn from §102(e) are (1) state traffic control
systems have not been superseded because of preclusion; (2)
states have been authorized to institute traffic control systems,
services, and schemes; and (3) they shall remain in force until
superseded by actual or necessary conflict with federal regulations promulgated by the Secretary.
This view of the PWSA harmonizes it with congressional
policy the Arco court identified in other water-related federal
statutes seeking to protect the marine and coastal environment
by invoking cooperative federalism. 33 Moreover, this view is consistent with the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Dublino, discussed above,'13 that "it would be incongruous for Congress on the
one hand to promote [a policy objective] and on the other to
prevent states from undertaking supplementary efforts toward
this very same end.' 35 Although Washington's Tanker Pollution
Law also seeks to protect that part of the state's economy based
on fish and shellfish, it shares two objectives with the PWSA:
vessel safety and protection of the marine environment.
Moreover, on June 1, 1976, the Secretary of Commerce approved Washington's Coastal Zone Management Program under
the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972.131 A vital part of
133. The fundamental nature of national policy is stated in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972: "to recognize, preserve and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of states to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(b) (Supp. IV 1974). The Estuarine Areas Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1221-26 (1970),
provides "it is declared to be the policy of Congress to recognize, preserve and protect the
responsibilities of the States in protecting, conserving, and restoring the estuaries of the
United States." Id. at § 1221. The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§
1451-64 (Supp. IV 1974), establishes a program of federal grants to coastal states for
developing coastal zone management programs, and is partially based on the following
finding: "The key to more effective protection and use of the land and water resources of
the coastal zone is to encourage the states to exercise their full authority over the land
and waters in the coastal zone .... " Id. at § 1451(h). The Deepwater Port Act of 1974,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24 (Supp. V 1975), provides for federal licensing of offshore ports for
supertankers and declares its purpose is, inter alia, to "protect the interests of the United
States and those adjacent coastal states in the location, construction and operation of
deepwater ports." 33 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975); and to "protect the rights and
responsibilities of states and communities to regulate growth, determine land use, and
otherwise protect the environment in accordance with law." 33 U.S.C. § 1501(4) (Supp.
V 1975). It seems obvious the PWSA must be interpreted consistently with this mass of
recently enacted legislation and allow for "cooperative federalism."
134. See text at note 87 supra.
135. N.Y. State Dep't of Pub. Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 419 (1973).
136. Jurisdictional Statement of Appellants at 20, Evans v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
No. 76-930 (U.S. Sup. Ct.).
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Washington's program consists of the identical policy incorporated in Washington's Tanker Pollution Law; namely, protection
of the marine environment by controlling oil supertanker access
to the environmentally sensitive waters of Puget Sound:
The State of Washington, as a matter of overriding policy,
positively supports the concept of a single, major crude petroleum receiving and transfer facility at or west of Port Angeles.
This policy shall be the fundamental, underlying principle for
state actions on the North Puget Sound and straits oil transportation issues . . . .3
In the absence of a clearly manifested congressional intent to the
contrary in the PWSA, the Secretary of Commerce's approval of
the policy embedded in Washington's Tanker Pollution Law
under the Coastal Zone Management Act shows Washington's
law is in harmony with other water-related federal laws and this
federal approval is also evidence of its consistency with the
31
PWSA.
The legislative history of the PWSA
further corroborates a
contemplated sharing of regulatory authority with the states on
several of Arco's questions: oil supertanker access to Puget
Sound's hazardous waters and oil tanker design, operation, and
safety requirements, at least until the Secretary promulgates conflicting regulations actually superseding Washington's law. The
authors of the PWSA never intended to preempt state and local
authority over vessel movement or design. Pursuant to a 1970
message on oil pollution by President Nixon, the Department of
Transportation transmitted to Congress what later became Title
I of PWSA. When doing so, then Secretary of Transportation
Volpe stated:
[W]e would expect to continue to encourage greater involvement and allocation of resources by state and local port authorities. Though the regulatory authority of our proposal will assure
appropriate federal coordination and general uniformity, the
scope of the port safety task as well as unique local conditions
and problems virtually compels local as well as federal effort. 3 9
Title II was added by the Senate which did not believe it was
displacing state and local governments' authority to legislate in
137. Id. at 20 n.21.
138. See text discussion at note 101 supra.
139. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972: Hearings on H.R. 8140 Before the
Subcomm. on Coast Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey, and Navigation of the House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971).
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the field. For example, during the Senate hearings on the PWSA,
it was stated:
THE CHAIRMAN [Warren Magnuson]. In some of these
places, like Puget Sound and probably Chesapeake Bay, San
Francisco Bay, the State could pass any kind of a tough law on
people coming in.
MR. NICKUM. That is right.
THE CHAIRMAN. I think in the Chesapeake Bay they have a
tristate commission involving Virginia, Delaware, and all the
people involved. The State may want to do that, but then only
could say that no ship could come in their inland waters unless
it complied with some of their guidelines. But this is something
we have got to work out. 40
The Arco court regrettably rendered its decision without
commenting on Title I §102(b), (c), and (e) of the PWSA or its
legislative history. These provisions appear to authorize cooperative federalism in the PWSA and to require a result directly opposite that reached by the Arco court. Indeed, they vindicate the
Supreme Court's general rule of preemption that "historic police
powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'1'

Supersession of State Law Because of Preclusion Under the
PWSA: Occupation of the Field
The Arco court was persuaded federal law had preempted the
field because Title I of the PWSA "establishes a comprehensive
federal scheme for regulating the operations, traffic routes, pilotage, and safety design specifications of tankers" and because
under "the PWSA, the Coast Guard can create traffic-control
systems for Puget Sound, and it has done so." ' Moreover, the
"PWSA gives the Coast Guard authority to restrict and even
exclude tankers from Puget Sound under adverse or hazardous
conditions."'' The court made no inquiry into whether the Coast
140. See note 11 supra, at 146.

141. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Again, during the last
Term of Court, the Supreme Court, although holding the challenged state statute
preempted, stressed the same point saying the assumption in favor of the validity of a

state law "provides assurance that 'the federal-state balance,' United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336, 349 (1971), will not be disturbed unintentionally by Congress or unnecessarily

by the courts." Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 97 S. Ct. 1305, 1309 (1977).
142. Arco, supra note 6, at 3.
143. Id.
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Guard had actually restricted access of oil tankers, or whether
there was an actual conflict between state and federal law; i.e., a
physical impossibility'" of complying with both, or whether the
subject matter permits no other conclusion than federal preemption,45 or whether "Congress has unmistakably. . . ordained"",
federal preemption. To the extent the court relied on the pervasive nature of the PWSA, which merely grants discretionary
power to the Secretary, without considering whether the state law
might consistently coexist, the court erroneously applied the discredited preemption doctrine favoring absolute federal preclusion. The extent to which the court relied on other factors, or
failed to consider them, is discussed below.
1. The Legislative History of the PWSA is Devoid of Preemptive
Intent.
The PWSA, on its face, does not express a clear and manifest
congressional purpose'4 7 to preclude all state regulation of oil
tankers. On the contrary, as explained above, it authorizes state
regulation of oil tankers. Moreover, a search of the legislative
history fails to reveal any general preemptive intent of Congress.
The one instance in which the word "preempt" appears is in the
context of an amendment. It cannot be characterized as showing
an unequivocally clear and manifest congressional purpose to preclude all state regulation of oil tankers."8 Neither the Arco court
nor the Arco plaintiffs identified any legislative history showing
express preemptive intent.
2. Is the Face of the PWSA Sufficiently Pervasive Generally to
Preclude State Regulation?
Not finding preemption clearly prescribed by either the text
or the legislative history of the PWSA, the Arco court found
preemption by determining that the face of the statute created a
comprehensive federal scheme for regulating oil tankers, an area
requiring national uniformity, thereby precluding states from
sharing any regulatory authority."19 Thus, if one ignores the inferences drawn from §102(b), (c), and (e) and the legislative history
144.
145.
146.
147.
Growers,
148.
149.

See text at note 114 supra.
See text at note 110 supra.
Id.
See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976) (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146-47 (1973)).
See text at notes 130 and 131 supra.
Arco, supra note 6, at 3.

106

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 1:73

of the PWSA, discussed above, the question is whether the
PWSA, on its face, clearly manifests congressional intent to preclude even harmonious state regulations.5 0 Washington's interest
in preventing massive oil spills on Puget Sound is obvious. It
cannot be persuasively maintained the PWSA involves an area
solely of such great national interest that the state's obviously
significant interests can easily be ignored or overridden. Given
the current test of preemption and Washington's important state
interests, general preclusion should be found on the ground of
"pervasiveness" only if the evidence is strong and manifestly
clear.
A.

Title I and Occupation of the Field

Regrettably, the Arco court based most of its view of preemption due to the comprehensiveness of the federal legislative
scheme solely on a grant of authority to the secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard operates. But without more,
the grant of authority, although comprehensive, is dormant, and
may remain so. Title I of the PWSA is permissive only, stating
the secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is
operating "may '"'5' create a comprehensive set of rules establishing vessel traffic control systems for such ports and waterways as
he deems appropriate. The grant of authority is discretionary,
and the Secretary is not obliged to create any vessel control rules
whatsoever.' 52 Thus, irrespective of the comprehensiveness of the
authority the PWSA delegated to the Secretary, upon which the
Arco court relied, it is impossible for Title I of the PWSA, in its
dormant state, to be equated with a clear and manifest congressional purpose to preclude all state regulations in the area. "Only
a demonstration that complete ouster of state power to promulgate laws not in conflict with federal laws-was the 'clear and
53
manifest purpose of Congress' would justify that conclusion."'
The Secretary is not obliged to create a vessel control system
for each and every port and waterway in the United States, including Puget Sound, nor if he acts is he obliged to create a
comprehensive set of rules including all aspects of vessel control.
Thus, the set of rules controlling vessels the Secretary may ulti150. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
151. 33 U.S.C. § 1221 (Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added).
152. Indeed, on Nov. 16, 1973, Congress directed the Secretary "to establish a vessel
traffic control system for Prince William Sound and Valdez, Alaska." 33 U.S.C. § 1221
(Supp. IV 1974).
153. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976).
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mately establish for Puget Sound might be fragmentary and certainly need not be comprehensive and exclusive of room for state
supplementation. Consequently, it appears the ruling of preclusion because of the comprehensiveness of the PWSA is in error.
But, more importantly, until the PWSA's federal control system
has been finally established, it is premature for the Arco court,
under H. P. Welch Co., Dublino, Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, and DeCanas,"I to determine there is such a degree of
comprehensiveness as to yield the clear judgment that Congress
has manifested its purpose to preclude all consistent state regulation.
As the Arco court noted, the Secretary has exercised his authority under the PWSA to create some rules applicable to Puget
Sound. He has created a rudimentary traffic control and reporting system for vessels on Puget Sound.'55 But this set of rules is
not comprehensive. It fails to address certain oil-tanker problems
such as sudden losses of power and lack of tanker maneuverability in hazardous waters-the very concerns of the pilot, tugescort, 5 ' and oil-tanker design features of Washington's Tanker
Pollution Law. Moreover, the Washington law's tug-escort,
alternative-design, and pilotage provisions can have no impact on
the vessel control system the Secretary established for Puget
Sound, and the Arco court found none. The Secretary's system
simply consists of separated traffic lanes, partial radar tracking,
and periodic reporting requirements,' all of which are unaffected
by Washington's tug-escort, alternative-design, and pilotage provisions. Finally, the Secretary has created no rules limiting or
regulating access of the more gigantic oil supertankers to Puget
Sound's treacherous Straits of Rosario or Georgia which, again,
is one of the crucial subjects of the Washington law.' It is noteworthy, but ignored by the Arco court, that Congress in the Deep
Water Port Act,"'5 enacted after the PWSA, expressly gave coastal
154. See text at notes 87, 95, 98, 100, and 111 supra.
155. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 161.101-.189 (1976).
156. The Coast Guard has published the required Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 41 Fed. Reg. 18770 (1976), stating that it may consider rules requiring tug escorts.
To date, there are no regulations, and, of course, none existed at the time of the Arco
decision.
157. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 161.101-.189 (1976).
158. The PWSA authorizes the Secretary to create rules controlling and restricting
vessel operation "in a hazardous area or under hazardous conditions." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1221(3)(iv) (Supp. IV 1974). Except for those noted immediately above, however, no
federal regulations have been promulgated regarding the hazardous waters of Puget
Sound.
159. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24 (Supp. IV 1974). Reliance on a subsequently enacted
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states an absolute veto power on construction of deep water
ports ° and therefore on whether oil supertankers might be allowed to enter and to service deep water ports located beyond
three miles from state shores.'' It is logically inconsistent that
Congress intended the State of Washington might absolutely control access of all oil supertankers whatever their characteristics to
deepwater ports located more than three miles out in the Pacific
Ocean, and at the same time, as the Arco court ruled, to preclude
the State of Washington from regulating access of oil supertankers to its inland waters of Puget Sound where the dangers of oil
supertanker transportation are severe and Washington's state
interests are far greater.
Contrary to the holding of the Arco court, Title I of the
PWSA is not so comprehensive in its dormant state as to preclude
all consistent state legislation.
B.

Title I and Occupation of the Field

Unlike Title I, Title II of the PWSA falls somewhere between
mandatory and permissive. In section 4417a(3), on the one hand,
Title II directs that the Secretary "shall" establish "additional
rules and regulations as may be necessary with respect to the
design and construction, alteration, repair and maintenance of
such vessels,"'' 2 including oil tankers.' 3 On the other hand, in its
important section 4417a(7), Title II directs the Secretary to begin
"publication as soon as practicableof, proposed rules and regulations setting forth minimum standards of design, construction,
alteration and repair of the vessels [including oil tankers] to
which this section applies for the purpose of protecting the marine environment.' 164 In any event, the Coast Guard, at the time
of the Arco suit, had recognized the federal regulations under
Title II of the PWSA as "not a complete and comprehensive
answer" to the oil tanker pollution problem.'65
Two points emerge. First, under Title II the Secretary is
statute is consistent with the Court's search for preemptive intent in DeCanas. See text
discussion at note 107 supra.
160. 33 U.S.C. § 1508(b) (Supp. V 1975).
161. 33 U.S.C. § 1503(c)(9) (Supp. V 1975). The state's veto power is only over the
construction of such a port, but obviously, if such a port cannot be constructed because
of a state's veto, it cannot be serviced.
162. 46 U.S.C. § 391a(3) (Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added).
163. Id. at § 391a(2)(B).
164. Id. at § 391a(7) (emphasis added).
165. U.S. COAST GUARD, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON REGULATION FOR
TANK VESSELS ENGAGED IN THE CARRIAGE OF OIL IN DOMESTIc TRADE 1 (1975).
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permitted considerable discretion in determining what additional
rules and regulations of oil tanker design and equipment, if any,
may be necessary, and in determining when it is practicable to
publish his new rules. To this extent Title II appears to be more
permissive than strictly mandatory.'" Second, Congress has expressly characterized any new rules the Secretary may promulgate as minimum standards, not maximum or uniform standards.
Thus, Congress's purpose in Title II is to establish a set of minimum regulations governing the design and equipment of oil tankers and other transport vessels. That Congress, itself, viewed
Title II as creating minimum standards that might be supplemented with consistent state law serves to negate the Arco court's
reasoning and conclusion that the subject areas of the PWSA
require either uniform or exclusively federal treatment. This
minimum-standards view yields an important inference harmonizing Title I and Title II along the lines of cooperative federalism, specifically, that states might supplement the Secretary's
minimum standard rules at least until there is either a direct or
necessary conflict with a federal regulation such that compliance
with both becomes a physical impossibility, at which time the
conflicting state regulation would be superseded. This inference
is founded in the express congressional wording of Title II, in
reason, and in case authority currently setting forth the preemption doctrine."7
The Arco court simply erred by failing to recognize Congress's own characterization of the Secretary's rules under Title
II, and by substituting its own unwarranted characterization of
them, stating that Congress's purpose under "Title II*of the
PWSA, was to establish a uniform set of regulations governing the
types of ships permitted within the coastal waters of the United
States and the conditions under which they would be permitted
to operate."'" To the contrary, Title II characterizes the stan166. See the concern of Governor Evans in the text at note 199 infra.
167. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), where
the Court upheld California's statute prohibiting entry of avocados not meeting the state's
minimum-oil-content standard of maturity although the avocados had been certified for
interstate commerce by the Secretary of Agriculture under federal regulations. The Court
characterized the federal standards regulating avocados (oil tankers?) as "minimum standards" rather than "uniform standards" (compare a contrary holding predicated upon
"uniform" federal regulations in Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961)),
and upheld
California's law, finding no "physical impossibility" of complying with both state and
federal standards. See also note 95 supra.
168. Arco, supra note 6, at 3. The court continued by saying "Balkanization of regulatory authority over this most interstate, even international, of transport systems is foreclosed by the national policy embodied in the PWSA. The PWSA has preempted § 3(2)
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dards as minimum which means, of course, they are not to be
considered as exclusive of complementary state law.
Because "federal regulation . . . should not be deemed

preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive
reasons-either that the nature of the regulated subject matter
permits no other conclusion, or that Congress has unmistakably
so ordained,"'' 9 neither Title I nor Title II, solely on its face,
preempts all consistent state regulation of the areas subject to
federal regulation under the PWSA simply because Congress has
delegated comprehensive authority to the Secretary to promulgate rules and regulations. It cannot be concluded that preemption is required because Congress's treatment of the subject matter in Title I or II permits no other conclusion or because
"Congress has unmistakably so ordained" that result.'70 Indeed,
as discussed above, Titles I and II, by their most reasonable inferences, affirmatively authorize consistent state regulation by providing for cooperative federalism: joint state and federal regulation in water-related areas subject to the PWSA.
Is There Supersession of Washington's Law Because of a Direct
Conflict with the PWSA?
There has been no general preclusion of state law simply
because of congressional passage of the PWSA. Nevertheless, it
is possible that the Secretary, in the exercise of his authority, has
promulgated a federal regulation either actually or necessarily
conflicting with state law such that it is a physical impossibility 7 '
to comply with both. And the possibility of preemption by another federal statute has not been considered. Thus, it is useful
to inquire whether Washington's Tanker Pollution Law actually
or necessarily conflicts with any other federal statute or with any
federal regulation issued by the Secretary and in force at the time
of the Arco decision.
A.

Pilots

Washington's law requires all oil tankers'72 of 50,000 or more
[governing supertanker design and equipment] of Washington's Tanker Law." To the
contrary, as discussed above, cooperative federalism is the national policy embodied in
the PWSA.
169. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976) (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)).
170. Id.
171. See text at note 114 supra.
172. Although Washington's law makes exception for enrolled vessels and vessels
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deadweight tons to "take [and pay] a Washington state licensed
pilot while navigating Puget Sound.' ' 73 The Arco court held this
provision void because "it conflicts with clear federal law on that
subject.",,7
The only possible source the Arco court cites for this clear
federal law is two sections of the United States Code.' s These
sections, however, are limited and apply only to all vessels engaged in the coastwise trade, indicating these vessels shall, when
under way, except on the high seas, be under the control and
direction of Coast Guard-licensed pilots. Coastwise seagoing vessels covered by the two Code sections consist. solely of American
vessels engaged in domestic trade or plying between port and port
in the same country, as distinguished from American vessels in
foreign trade. Moreover, the sections do not apply to foreign trade
or to foreign flag ships."' Thus, the Arco court is, perhaps, half
correct. If the Arco case involved American vessels engaged in the
coastwise trade, Washington could not require them to take on
state pilots. In such circumstances the two cited sections have the
potentiality of conflicting with state law, but only if the vessel
involved is licensed under the United States flag and only if engaged in the coastwise trade, such as transporting Alaskan oil to
west coast ports. As to foreign flag oil tankers, or American flag
oil tankers not engaged in the coastwise trade, there can be no
conflict between state and federal law-Washington's law can
apply. Of course, at the time of the Arco decision, no vessels were
actually engaged in the coasting trade by transporting Alaskan
crude oil to Puget Sound because Alaskan oil had not yet started
to flow. The cited sections of the United States Code may conflict
and supersede Washington's law requiring pilots on certain vessels in Puget Sound waters, but only if those vessels are American
and only if they also are engaged in the coastwise trade; otherwise, there would be neither conflict nor supersession."'
exclusively engaged in the coasting trade (WASH. REV. CODE § 88.16.070 (1976)), the
exception is inapplicable to the pilotage requirement for oil tankers in excess of 50,000
dwt. See WASH. REv. CODE § 88.16.180 (1976).
173. WASH. REv. CODE § 88.16.180 (1976).
174. Arco, supra note 6, at 4.
175. 46 U.S.C. §§ 215 and 364 (1970).
176. See, e.g., In re Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 278 F. 180 (W.D. Wash. 1921). State
pilotage laws applied to a British vessel coming from a foreign port do not conflict with a
treaty provision that "no higher or other duties or charges shall be imposed in any ports
of the United States on British vessels than those payable in the same ports by vessels of
the United States" because of the exemption from state pilotage laws of coastwise vessels
of the United States. Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 344 (1904). See note 95 supra.
177. Only state pilotage provisions conflicting with federal law are thereby su-
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Oil Supertanker Design and Equipment

Before permitting unescorted access to the entire body of
Puget Sound, Washington's law requires oil tankers between
40,000 and 125,000 deadweight tons to have double bottoms beneath all oil and liquid cargo compartments;' 8 two radar systems,
one of which must be collision avoidance radar;'7 9 twin screws,
and shaft horsepower in the ratio of one horsepower to each two
and one-half deadweight tons, plus such other navigational position location systems as may be prescribed.180 An oil supertanker
between 40,000 and 125,000 tons can easily escape all of Washington's design and equipment standards by simply using a tug escort when traversing Puget Sound's waters. In other words, Washington did not mandate that supertankers of this class must necessarily be of state-specified design and carry state-specified
equipment before they would be permitted to use Puget Sound.
What Washington mandated is that supertankers of this class
must comply with Washington design and equipment standards
if and only if the supertankers wanted to cross Puget Sound's
waters solely under their own power. Thus, the design and equipment standards found in Washington's Tanker Law cannot possibly conflict with any federal law or regulation for the simple
reason Washington has not exclusively imposed them as a matter
of state law.'8 '
On December 13, 1976, acting under the PWSA, the Secretary promulgated several new rules regulating oil tanker design
and equipment.8 2 These regulations were deemed "necessary to
perseded. The state law, as a whole, is not void, and the remaining parts of a state's
pilotage law can be applied. State v. Ring, 122 Or. 644, 259 P. 780 (1927), aff'd per curiam,
276 U.S. 607 (1928). Although regulations of commerce, state pilotage laws are within
states' constitutional power until Congress abrogates such power. Robins Dry Dock &
Repair Co. v. Navigazone Libera Triestina S.A., 279 N.Y.S. 257, 154 Misc. 788 (Sup. Ct.
1931), aff'd 261 N.Y. 455, 185 N.E. 698 (1931), cert. denied, sub nom. Moran Towing &
Trans. Co. v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 290 U.S. 657 (1933).
178. Recently proposed federal regulations will, if adopted, require supertankers in
excess of 20,000 dwt constructed under a contract awarded after Dec. 31, 1979, or delivered
after Dec. 31, 1981, to provide for segregated ballast and double bottoms. 42 Fed.
Reg. 24868 (1977).
179. Recently proposed federal regulations will, if adopted, require oil tankers in
excess of 10,000 gross tons to equip with "a second radar system and collision avoidance
equipment." 42 Fed. Reg. 24871 (1977).
180. There is no doubt oil supertankers of this class meeting Washington's design and
equipment standards also meet all PWSA standards. See 42 Fed. Reg. 5955 (1977) (to be
codified in 33 C.F.R. § 164) (navigational safety rules); 42 Fed. Reg. 24868, 24869, 24871,
24874 (1977) (proposed new design and equipment rules).
181. WASH. Rv. CODE § 88.16.190 (1976).
182. 41 Fed. Reg. 54177 (1976).
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bring the vessels to which they apply into compliance with requirements already applicable to United States tank vessels in
domestic trade.' 1 3 The new regulations, which set minimum
standards, do not deal with the same items as Washington's law
and are not in direct conflict with it; thus, Washington's law is
supplemental. The Arco court did not refer to, or rely on, the new
regulations.' It is possible, however, at some future time new
federal rules will be promulgated pertaining to the same subjects
as Washington's law. If so, and if an oil tanker qualified under
new federal regulations but not under Washington's and the vessel was also federally certified to engage in the coastwise trade,
e.g., a vessel federally certified to transport Alaskan crude oil, but
prohibited from doing so on Puget Sound by Washington's law,
there would be a conflict. Such a conflict, however, is in the
future; the Arco court found none. Its proper resolution is not
fully clear.8 5
C.
In the event
deadweight tons
ment standards,
Sound so long as

Tug Escort

an oil supertanker between 40,000 and 125,000
fails to meet Washington's design and equipWashington's law still permits it to use Puget
it has a tug escort.' This provision is the heart

183. Id. at 54179.
184. Federal regulations adopted at time of suit in Arco, promulgated under Title II
of the PWSA, have been characterized by the Coast Guard as "not a complete and
comprehensive answer" to the problem of oil tanker pollution; in short, they are
"minimum" and incomplete regulations. U.S. COAST GUARD, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT
STATEMENT ON REGULATIONS FOR TANK VESSELS ENGAGED IN THE CARRIAGE OF OIL
IN DOMESTIc TRADE at 1 (1975). The aim of these regulations is primarily to reduce the risks of
operational pollution. Id. at 1, 2, 6, 6a, 60e, and 60f. The primary aim of the oil supertanker design and equipment provisions of Washington's law, however, is to reduce the
risks of accidental pollution. President Carter's initiatives announced March 18, 1977, go
well beyond existing regulations regarding new design, equipment, construction, and manning requirements for vessels, but they, too, leave room for state supplementation. See
Hearings on S. 682 Before Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 835 (1977) (statement of Brock Adams). President Carter's initiatives do not address access limitations to hazardous or sensitive waters, the use of pilots,
or the need for tugboat aid-all of great concern in Washington's Tanker Law. See the
proposed new regulations in 42 Fed. Reg. 24868, 24869, 24871, and 24874 (1977).
185. Contra, Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
186. WASH. REV. CODE § 88.16.190 (1976). Admiral Siler, in his testimony before the
Senate Commerce Committee in 1976, acknowledged the necessity of a tugboat provision:
Notwithstanding the great desire for improvement in vessel stopping and turning capability we see no prospect of altering the physical fact of the tremendous
mass momentum of a ship underway by any practical mechanical means. The
same initial factor which makes a ship an economical method of transportation
precludes quickly stopping its motion. The only feasible way of accomplishing
this is through controlling its speed in certain critical locations.
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of Washington's law. It is severable,187 even though Washington's
law regulating oil tanker design and equipment was striken as
8 s The possibility of requiring tug escorts
violative of the PWSA.1
is left open on the face of the PWSA, and its legislative history is
silent on the subject. No federal legislation requires tug escorts,
nor has the Secretary of Transportation mandated them under
the PWSA.
The Arco court noted the PWSA authorizes the Secretary to
require a tug escort in Puget Sound'8 9 and, although it has not,
"the Coast Guard has considered doing this," citing an environmental impact statement. 9 " Astoundingly, and without further
discussion prior to or thereafter, the court concluded: "We believe
that the tugboat-escort provision of [Washington's] Tanker law
has also been preempted by the federal laws." 9 '
To the extent the Arco court relied upon preemption due to
preclusion because of an unexercised congressional grant of authority to the Secretary to require tug escorts on Puget Sound, its
decision is in error as discussed above. To the extent the court
may have correctly relied on the environmental impact statement
for authority that the Coast Guard had considered tug escorts, it
is still in error as discussed above. Congress has characterized the
PWSA as setting minimal, not uniform or maximum, standards;
when safeguarding its interest a state may supplement the PWSA
with consistent law. To the extent the Arco court relied on the
conflict-supersession ground and on the environmental impact
statement to determine that federal law conflicts with Washington's tugboat-escort provision, the court announced a novel
preemption doctrine without any foundation in precedent and
We are therefore considering regulatory proposals which would require tug
assistance for particular vessels.
Hearings on the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 76-77 (1976).
187. The statute appears severable according to the severability tests advanced in
State v. Anderson, 81 Wash. 2d 234, 501 P.2d 184 (1972). Under Washington law a severability clause is deemed conclusive unless, by facts that are proper subjects of judicial
notice, it fairly can be said the legislative declaration of intent, on its face, is obviously
false. In the absence of a severability clause the test is whether the legislature would have
passed the remaining provisions without the unconstitutional portion. Id. See also United
States v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 563 (1968) (accord, applying federal standards); Washington's
severability clause, WASH. REV. CODE § 88.16.160 (1976).
188. Arco, supra note 6, at 6.
189. 33 U.S.C. § 1221(3)(iv) (Supp. IV 1974).
190. COAST GUARD, DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT [ON THE] REGULATIONS FOR TANK VESSELS ENGAGED IN THE CARRIAGE OF OIL IN DOMES-

TIC TRADE 71 (1975).

191. Arco, supra note 6,at 4.
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without presenting any reasoned supporting discussion." 2 Because the Coast Guard's environmental impact statement is not
part of federal law, and because the Secretary has not promulgated any regulations regarding tugboat escorts on Puget Sound,
any claimed preemptive conflict between the environmental impact statement and Washington's tug-escort provision is unfounded.
"Since September 8, 1975, the effective date of Chapter 125
[Washington's Tanker Law] all tankers between 40,000 and
125,000 DWT have used tug escorts."' 93 Thus, beyond any doubt,
Washington's Tanker Law can simultaneously stand and be reconciled with Congress's PWSA and its federal regulations without
any conflict because, in fact, it has. There has been no conflict
with the rudimentary Vessel Traffic System the Coast Guard
established for Puget Sound. That system only establishes separate lanes, partial radar tracking, and some periodic reporting
requirements, but it does not create a comprehensive traffic control system on Puget Sound.' 4 Moreover, the two laws have operated complementally, side by side, without complaints about
their detrimental effects by members of Washington's oil industry, including the Atlantic Richfield Company. Because the Supreme Court has long held repugnance or conflict should be found
only where it is "direct and positive, so that the two acts could
not be reconciled or consistently stand together,"'5 5 the PWSA
does not preempt, either by preclusion or by conflictsupersession, Washington's provision requiring tugboat escort on
Puget Sound for oil supertankers; the Arco court erred when it
held the state and federal laws could not stand together.
D.

Prohibitionof Supertankers in Excess of 125,000 Deadweight
Tons
Washington's law prohibits any oil tanker of greater than

192. Neither tug-escort requirements nor access limits were considered at the time
the rudimentary Vessel Traffic System for Puget Sound was established. See generally
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Puget Sound Vessel Traffic System, 38 Fed. Reg. 2122735 (1973); Final Rule and Regulations for Vessel Traffic Systems in Puget Sound, 33
C.F.R. § 161 (1976). Moreover, no person testified or submitted comments on whether tugescort or vessel access limits should be established. The subjects were outside the scope
of the rule-making. See generally Public Docket, CGD 73-158PH (1973).
193. Brief of Appellants at 7, Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., No. 76-930 (U.S. Sup.
Ct.).
194. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 161.101-189 (1976). Certain amendments not relevant to the
subject matter under discussion have been proposed. See 42 Fed. Reg. 3182 (1977).
195. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 148 (1902) (citing Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S.
227, 243 (1859)).
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125,000 deadweight tons "from proceeding beyond a point east of
a line extending from Discovery Island light south to New Dungeness light."'' 6 This section excludes these tankers only from Puget
Sound, not from all navigable waters lying within or adjacent to
Washington. Moreover, it affects only that part of interstate and
foreign trade carried on by oil supertankers of 125,000 deadweight
tons or more. This provision is valid and without preemptive
infirmity because the Secretary's regulations promulgated under
the PWSA do not speak to the issue and are unaffected by the
absence from Puget Sound of oil supertankers in excess of 125,000
deadweight tons.'9 7
CONCLUSION

The first trickle of Alaskan oil is arriving in Washington
ports. In 1978, that trickle will grow to a flood and bring combined
potentialities of providing for all Washington's oil needs and destroying Puget Sound. Clearly, a comprehensive vessel traffic system for Washington's waters is a minimally needed mechanism,
and the rudimentary one the Coast Guard recently established for
several parts of Puget Sound is to be applauded. It is inadequate,
however, and should be expanded to control the complete and
exact route all oil tankers follow in all parts of Washington waters. Most importantly, a fully radar-controlled vessel traffic system, beginning with oil tanker entrance at the Straits of Juan de
Fuca, is sorely needed.
Even if the Secretary of Transportation establishes these
improvements through the Coast Guard, no matter how sophisticated the vessel transport system might become, it could not
prevent oil spills due to supertanker groundings, explosions,' 8 or
collisions caused by human error or mechanical failure. The
needed improvements have not been established. Indeed, according to Governor Daniel J. Evans, "The Coast Guard has steadily
retreated from its 1973 position, and has now turned into an
advocate for 'economic' considerations" on behalf of shipowners,
so much so that during the years since 1972 the Coast Guard
196. WASH. REV. CODE § 88.16.190(1) (1976).
197. It is possible, of course, like California's law in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), this provision of Washington's law might pass muster
under the preemption doctrine but fail to do so under the negative implications doctrine.
See J.R. Brooks & Son v. Reagan, No. C71-1311 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 1973); Deutsch,
Precedent and Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 1553 (1974).
198. Recently proposed regulations will require, if adopted, safer inert gas systems
to reduce the risks of in-tank explosions aboard supertankers. 42 Fed. Reg. 24874 (1977).
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appears to have intended to use "those years to 'buy time' for the
industry it should be regulating, for example, in getting
minimum-cost vessels 'grandfathered' into the Alaskan oil
trade."' 99 Alaskan oil continued to press on Puget Sound. Recognizing time was of the essence, and seeking to protect its property, its economy, its marine environment, and the health and
welfare of its citizens, Washington's legislature passed its Tanker
Pollution Law which the Arco court held preempted by the Federal Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972.
The Arco court committed error. It rushed to judgment, ignoring the standing and abstention problems presented by the
case. It adjudicated solely on preemption grounds without carefully analyzing whether Congress had clearly manifested a
preemptive intent and apparently oblivious of standards currently required under the preemption doctrine; it adjudicated
under the wrong test of preemption, ignoring the principles laid
down in cases such as FloridaLime & Avocado Growers, although
that case had been argued to it.20° Moreover, the court evinced no
awareness of the reaffirmation of FloridaLime & Avocado Growers's preemption principles by DeCanas v. Bica, although
DeCanas was unanimously decided only seven months before the
Arco court rendered decision and it, too, was argued to the
court. 0'1 Furthermore, the court discussed and cited only three
cases in its opinion; one not concerning preemption,0 2 and two
upholding state regulations, discussed solely for the purpose of
distinguishing them.203 The court, therefore, relied on no affirma199. Hearings on The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976) (letter to committee from Daniel J.
Evans, Governor, State of Washington).
200. Brief for Defendants at 20 and 28, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Evans, No. C75648M (W.D. Wash.).
201. Id. at 21, 44, 52, 79-80, and 84 n.33.
202. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Defendant challenged the court's jurisdiction based upon this case, inviting the court to overrule it: the invitation was declined.
203. The three cases the Court cites were the only preemption cases it believed were
relevant, evidently on the theory they involved ships! Huron Portland Cement Co. v.
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (discussed in text at note 57 supra), was distinguished by
invoking the discredited presumption of federal preemption, that is, The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-26 (Supp. V 1975), demanded exclusive
regulation in the field because it introduced some minimum "environmental considerations into the federal tanker regulations." Arco, supra note 6, at 5 and n.4. Askew v.
American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973), which upheld Florida's deterrent approach to the problem by imposing strict liability on oil spillers, was distinguished
on the grounds (1) that Florida's "statute did not attempt to regulate the design of the
tanker or tanker operations, which were already federally regulated," and (2) that Askew
"involved the Federal Water Quality Control Act, not the PWSA, and the holding of the
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tive authority whatsoever. No case was discussed or cited giving
credence to, or justifying, its approach or solution of the preemption problem present in Arco. Finally, the court did not carefully
analyze Washington's Tanker Pollution Law or the federal statute it held preemptive of Washington's statute, that is, the Federal Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972. Instead, the court
proceeded by speculation, surmise, and just plain guesswork, ultimately resting its decision implicitly on the discredited presumption of federal preemption of the 1940's, 50's, and 60's, to the
effect that whenever Congress has touched a field also state regulated, the state law is precluded by supersession, irrespective of
whether the two laws might consistently regulate the area, because Congress has occupied the field. Thus, the Arco court's
radical preemption holding reached a result not intended by the
framers of the PWSA. The sponsor of the PWSA in the Senate,
Warren Magnuson, Chairman of the Senate's Commerce Committee, has disagreed publicly with the analysis of the Arco court:
As the sponsor of the Act [the PWSA] in the Senate, I have
made known my disagreement with the decision. I think it is
wrong; I feel the Court has simply misread the intent of Congress as contained in the Ports and Waterways Safety Act. The
weakness of the decision is highlighted by the complete absence
of any analysis of the terms of the Act. The Court's reasoning
was simplistic at best. Preemption is not favored in the law.
Congress must show a clear intent to preempt before such a
finding is made. This court summarily reached its decision on
the thinnest of reasoning. I say they are wrong.0I
Indeed, rather than intending to preempt the field, it appears
Congress, in the PWSA and its legislative history, inferentially
authorized joint state and federal regulation, at least until a federal regulation is issued under the PWSA actually conflicting
with state law.
Finally, unlike court decisions in other areas, the subjects of
the Arco case are oil, oil transportation, and protection of the
marine environment. These subjects surely have full congressional attention today. For example, in February, 1977, the Commerce Committee reported out two pending bills; one would establish a uniform and comprehensive legal regime governing liaCourt was in part reflective of the congressional policy of 'cooperative federalism' in the
Federal Water Quality Act." Arco, supra note 6, at 5. (These distinctions, however, assume the answer to Arco's question.)
204. S. 17575, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. 17575 (1976).

19771

State Laws Against Oil Spills

bility and compensation for damages and cleanup costs caused by
oil spill pollution, 205 and the other would amend the PWSA to
increase the standards for and use of U.S. vessels to carry imported oil in an attempt to reduce oil spill risks, expressly put oil
tanker pilotage under state controls, and deal with other matters.2 6 Because Congress is very active in these fields and because
Congress is the proper regulator of our federal system, there can
be little justification for doubtful judicial activity. Washington's
Tanker Pollution Law is supplemental to Congress's PWSA
which only establishes minimum standards. It is possible to comply with both statutes, and the two can stand together at least
until the Secretary issues conflicting federal regulations. In light
of the above; in light of the absence of express congressional intent to preempt, and in light of the proper inferences of congressional intent drawn from the PWSA impliedly authorizing state
regulation, the Arco court's holding does not persuasively establish that the subject matter of the PWSA permits of one and only
one conclusion-that federal power should be deemed preemptive
because "Congress has unmistakably so ordained."2' 7
205. S. 687, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See also Hearings on Recent Tanker Accidents Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation,95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977).
206. S. 682, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See Hearings on S. 682 Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
207. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).

